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Between 2005 and 2009, the Detainee Treatment Act of 20051 
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(hereinafter “DTA”), Military Commissions Act of 20062 (hereinafter 
“MCA06”), and Military Commissions Act of 20093 (hereinafter 
“MCA09”) were each passed by Congress and signed into law by either 
President Bush or President Obama. Add to that threesome the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force4 (hereinafter “AUMF”), and 
you have the complete legislative underpinnings of military detention in 
the War on Terror. Despite two attempts by Congress and the President 
to block the judiciary from significant involvement (or interference, 
depending on one’s point of view) in the detention of terrorism 
suspects, the judiciary grasped control through a series of Supreme 
Court decisions. Since the last of these decisions, Boumediene v. Bush,5 
which granted Guantanamo Bay detainees habeas corpus rights, 
Congress and the President have largely abdicated control over the rules 
of detention to the judiciary, other than the notable exception of 
reforming the military commissions system in 2009. 
With terrorism policy often dominating the headlines and political 
discussion in Washington, the premise that Congress and the Executive 
have abdicated the issue to the courts may seem farfetched. Indeed, it 
seems there are daily newspaper articles and congressional discussions 
about the best way to detain, interrogate, and try terrorism suspects. 
Unfortunately, though, all of this talk and coverage increasingly leads to 
partisans retreating to their respective corners to score political points 
off of heated national security and civil-liberties rhetoric. While 
Congress and the President argue back and forth about the particular 
terrorism case of the day, unelected federal judges are left the 
unenviable, and to some judges, unwanted, task of de facto legislating 
lasting detention policy. 
If one accepts the premise that all the talk in the halls of Congress 
regarding detention policy is just that — talk — the question becomes, 
 
and comments, and Ben Wittes and Robert Chesney for their advice in drafting the Terrorist 
Detention Review Reform Act. 
1 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-06, 119 Stat. 2680, 
2739-44 (2005).  
2 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
3 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-07, 123 Stat. 2190, 
2574-2614 (2009).  
4 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 
224 (2001) (authorizing “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. . . .”).  
5 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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given the clear congressional interest in the issue, why the inertia on 
legislative progress? The transfer of power from President Bush to 
President Obama in 2009 gave many Obama supporters the hope that he 
would dramatically alter detention policy and move to a law 
enforcement model where all suspects would be tried or released.6 Much 
to their disappointment, President Obama has found it prudent to 
continue many of the detention policies of his predecessor, including 
indefinite detention without trial.7At least with respect to the policies 
that President Obama has chosen to continue, there appears to be some 
degree of broad agreement in Congress. Congressional proponents of a 
“try or release” policy, for example, are now few and far between.8 With 
the universe of disagreement shrinking and federal judges asking for 
legislative guidance,9 it must be asked why there has been no action on 
 
6 See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Obama Should Not Delay Closure 
of Guantanamo and Military Comm’ns, Says ACLU (Jan. 12, 2009), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/obama-should-not-delay-closure-guantanamo-and-
military-commissions-says-aclu (“[D]etainees should be prosecuted in our traditional courts, 
which are the best in the world and fully capable of handling sensitive national security 
issues without compromising fundamental rights. If there is not [sufficient evidence], 
detainees should be repatriated to countries that don’t practice torture. Fundamental and 
transformative change is neither incremental nor tentative.”). 
7 In his speech at the National Archives, President Obama endorsed military detention 
for those detainees “who cannot be prosecuted for past crimes, but who nonetheless pose a 
threat to the security of the United States,” and received criticism from civil liberties 
organizations. Peter Finn, Obama Endorses Indefinite Detention Without Trial for Some, 
WASH. POST, May 22, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article 
/2009/05/21/AR2009052104045.html. In March 2011, President Obama issued an executive 
order governing long-term detention review for Guantanamo detainees. Press Release, The 
White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Executive Order — Periodic Review of Individuals 
Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/03/07/executive-order-periodic-review-individuals-detained-guant-namo-bay-
nava (at the time of publication the Executive Order had not yet been published in the 
Federal Register). 
8 But cf. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventative Detention, Suspected Terrorists, 
and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 727 (2009) (noting that some human rights groups 
maintain that the government must “try or release” military detainees). 
9 Several District of Columbia District Court judges have been vocal in urging Congress 
to provide guidance on habeas procedures and expressing trepidation with the current 
process. Judge Thomas F. Hogan, who coordinates the detainee cases, has stated that “[i]t is 
unfortunate, in my view, that the Legislative Branch of the government, and the Executive 
Branch, have not moved more strongly to provide uniform, clear rules and laws for handling 
these cases,” and “I think that would have been best for the Legislature to have passed new 
rules and procedures and rules of evidence to handle these cases.” Lyle Denniston, 
Commentary: Did Boumediene Leave Too Much Undone?,SCOTUSBLOG, (Dec. 22, 2009, 
5:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/12/commentary-did-boumediene-leave-too-
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the part of Congress? 
Undoubtedly, for some in Congress, detention policy is worth more 
as a political issue than as a potential policy accomplishment. That is, 
even if one could wave a magic wand and instantly create a policy 
compromise that left all parties satisfied, some in Congress might 
decline in order to keep the political issue alive. While the specter of 
our legislative representatives playing politics with war policy is cynical 
and depressing, that motivation cannot be discounted. Similarly, 
detention issues may reemerge in the news with each foiled attack and 
judicial order of release, giving politicians an opportunity to demagogue 
and attack the other side while avoiding any responsibility for the 
consequences of policy decisions. In sum, by allowing the judiciary to 
take the lead on detention policy, Congress avoids the tough decisions 
and responsibility that comes therewith, while keeping a potent political 
issue alive. 
What, then, of the President? During his campaign, President 
Obama certainly had harsh words for President Bush on his handling of 
detention policy,10 and action was quick once the new administration 
was installed. The Obama administration began with an executive order 
setting a deadline for the closing of the detention center at Guantanamo 
Bay.11 President Obama basked in applause12 as he ordered the closing of 
 
much-undone/. Judge Reggie Walton said, “It should be Congress that decides a policy such 
as this that has a monumental impact on our society and makes a monumental impression on 
the world community.” Chief Judge Royce Lamberth said, “How confident can I be that if I 
make the wrong choice that he won’t be the one that blows up the Washington Monument or 
the Capitol?” Chisun Lee, Judges Urge Congress to Act on Indefinite Terrorism Detentions, 
PROPUBLICA (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.propublica.org/article/judges-urge-congress-to-act-
on-indefinite-terrorism-detentions-122.  
10 See Sam Graham-Felsen, Obama Statement on Today’s Supreme Court Decision, 
ORG. FOR AM. (June 12, 2008, 4:16:05 PM), http://my.barackobama.com/page/community/ 
post/samgrahamfelsen/gG5Gz5 (“The Court’s [Boumediene] decision is a rejection of the 
Bush Administration’s attempt to create a legal black hole at Guantanamo. . . “). 
11 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
12 See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, President Obama Orders 
Guantanamo Closed and End to Torture (Jan. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/president-obama-orders-guantanamo-closed-and-end-
torture (quoting Anthony D. Romero, Executive Director of the ACLU, as saying, 
“President Obama should be highly commended for this bold and decisive action so early in 
his administration on an issue so critical to restoring an America we can be proud of again,” 
and Caroline Fredrickson, Director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office as saying, 
“[b]y shutting Guantanamo, ending torture, and closing the CIA secret prisons abroad, 
President Obama has given America a much-needed and significant break from the Bush 
administration policies that, with utter disregard for our Constitution, trampled our nation’s 
values and ideals.”). 
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a prison that both his predecessor and election opponent aspired to close 
as well.13 Meanwhile, the administration avoided answering the 
questions that would have set the stage for fulfillment of the executive 
order’s deadline. Task forces were formed14 and prosecution protocols 
were issued,15 but basic policy questions were left to the future and the 
courts. Who may the President detain, for how long, and under what 
evidentiary standard? What process will detainees receive beyond their 
habeas proceedings? How will the administration respond to a court 
order of release into the United States? 
Rather than answer these questions through a comprehensive plan, 
the administration decided to allow litigation to drive the policy process, 
deciding issues on an ad hoc basis. Surely, one of the reasons for this 
course was President Obama’s desire to avoid alienating his supporters 
by validating President Bush’s detention theory. The few decisions 
President Obama made in this area, such as negotiating and embracing 
the MCA09, nibbled around the edges of President Bush’s military 
detention and trial policy, but certainly did not reject it wholesale.16 
The current political environment creates incentives for both 
Congress and the President to abdicate their responsibility for 
legislating detention policy to the judiciary. As a result of Boumediene, 
federal courts are more involved in military detention than ever, and 
 
13 Maria Bartiromo, The Unvarnished McCain, BUSINESSWEEK, June 4, 2007, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_23/b4037095.htm (quoting Senator 
McCain as saying, “[w]hen I’m President, I will close Guantanamo Bay.”); Melissa 
McNamara, Bush Says He Wants to Close Guantanamo, CBS NEWS (May 8, 2006), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/08/politics/main1596464.shtml (quoting President 
Bush as saying, “I very much would like to end Guantanamo.”). 
14 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (creating a task force to 
review “the status of each individual currently detained at Guantanamo. . . .”); Exec. Order 
No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009) (creating a task force to review future 
detention policy); see Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 419 
(2010) (“[T]he Obama White House crafted a mechanism for detention policy-making to 
reflect this political pressure: Delegating the hard decisions to someone else who would take 
the political heat.”). 
15 DEP’T OF DEF. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DETERMINATION OF GUANTANAMO CASES 
REFERRED FOR PROSECUTION (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents 
/taba-prel-rpt-dptf-072009.pdf.  
16 The MCA09 altered a number of provisions of the MCA06, including changes in 
nomenclature, hearsay and voluntariness standards, and the prohibition of the use of 
statements elicited through torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. See JENNIFER 
ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41163, THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2009: 
OVERVIEW AND LEGAL ISSUES (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
natsec/R41163.pdf (comparing the provisions of MCA06 to MCA09).  
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they are doing their best to fashion reasonable detention rules in the 
absence of guidance by either the Supreme Court or the political 
branches of government.17 Federal judges, though, do not have expertise 
in military or intelligence matters, and they do not answer to the 
electorate. American citizens and soldiers deserve greater input from the 
political branches.18 Policymaking by the judiciary in this area leads to 
inconsistent, ad hoc decisions that are opaque to the average voter. 
While Candidate Obama argued that detention policy was a “legal black 
hole” under President Bush,19 the issue has become a political black hole 
under President Obama. 
This article will focus on the reforms to military detention policy 
proposed in the Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act (hereinafter 
“TDERRA”).20 Part I will examine the President’s authority to detain 
enemy belligerents in the War on Terror. Part II will discuss the 
procedures of the habeas corpus proceedings for current and future 
enemy belligerents. Finally, Part III will consider additional issues that 
are not addressed in TDERRA — the process for enemy belligerents 
determined to be lawfully held by a habeas court and the future of the 
Guantanamo Bay detention center. 
 
17 While I argue that the procedures for military detention should be created by 
Congress and the President, some commentators argue that the Supreme Court should have 
been more detailed in its discussion of the habeas right recognized in Boumediene. One of 
such commentators has written:   
The net result of Boumediene, therefore, was to leave the substantive law of 
executive detention incrementally murkier than before. While doctrinal 
ambiguity is often one outcome of Supreme Court review, it is at last peculiar 
that an opinion justified as a means to promote legal certainty would leave so 
much for subsequent resolution through an inevitably fragmented process of 
district court resolution and appellate clarification. Boumediene, that is, can be 
criticized for failing to promote the legal clarity that was one of its central 
normative premises. It was, from on one view, an exercise in legality without 
law. 
Huq, supra note 14, at 412. 
18 See Cole, supra note 8, at 694. I do not argue that the government lacks “existing 
laws and authorities…to effectuate preventive detention,” which Professor Cole comments 
is “overstat[ing] the case.” Id. Rather, I agree that there is existing authority for preventive 
detention, but the procedures for implementing preventive detention are being designed by 
federal judges, rather than Congress and the President. The greatest benefit of new 
legislation would be refining the operation of preventive detention, not creating a prevention 
regime where there was none before. 
19 E.g. Graham-Felsen, supra note 10. 
20 S. 3707, 111th Cong. (2010); see also Detention of Unprivileged Enemy Belligerents 
Act, S. 553, 112th Cong. (2011) (incorporating a number of alterations designed to attract 
broader Republican support in the Senate). 
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I. AUTHORITY TO DETAIN 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,21 the Supreme Court held that the AUMF 
granted the President the authority to detain individuals, including 
citizens, in the War on Terror.22 In addition to relying on the AUMF as 
the source of detention authority, the Bush administration relied on the 
presidential authority inherent in Article II.23 This practice was in 
keeping with that administration’s (possibly shortsighted)24 desire to 
expand the power of the presidency and involve Congress as little as 
possible in wartime decision-making. From the executive system of 
military commissions that was struck down by Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,25 to 
opposition to congressional limitations on the interrogation of terrorism 
suspects,26 to reliance on executive power as a means to detain, the Bush 
administration was consistent in its desire to rely upon its Article II 
power to the fullest. 
The Obama administration, on the other hand, has relied on the 
AUMF as the President’s sole source of power to detain enemy 
belligerents.27 This is not surprising, given President Obama’s intention 
to distance his administration from the terrorism policies of the Bush 
administration that he so roundly criticized as a presidential 
 
21 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
22 Id. at 518.  
23 E.g. Brief for the Respondents at 13-14, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) 
(No. 03-6696), 2003 U.S. Briefs 6696.  
24 See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 212 (2007) (“[T]he Bush administration’s strategy is guaranteed not 
to work, and is certain to destroy trust altogether. When an administration makes little 
attempt to work with the other institutions of our government and makes it a public priority 
to emphasize that its aim is to expand its power, Congress, the courts, and the public listen 
carefully, and worry.”). 
25 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
26 See Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/01/04/bush_could_bypass_new_torture_b
an/ (“The White House tried hard to kill the McCain amendment [banning cruel, inhuman, 
and degrading treatment of detainees].”). 
27 E.g., Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority 
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 
08-442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/ 
documents/BatesRevisedDetAuthFINAL.pdf?rd=1 [hereinafter Memorandum of 
Respondents]. 
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candidate.28 While relying solely on statutory authority for its detention 
power and changing some of the legal nomenclature that retained 
political baggage from the Bush years,29 the Obama administration did 
not reject Bush’s detention policy. The administration continued to 
detain individuals under the law of war, albeit while aggressively 
attempting to transfer many detainees to other countries and refusing to 
add new detainees to the Guantanamo population.30 Even these policies, 
though, were not drastic changes from the Bush administration. After 
all, President Bush announced his intention to close Guantanamo Bay, 
and new transfers to the detention center largely halted in 
2004.31 Indeed, the Obama administration’s most controversial departure 
from existing detainee policy occurred when Attorney General Eric 
Holder announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other 9/11 
co-conspirators held at Guantanamo Bay would be tried in civilian 
courts in New York,32 but that decision was widely criticized by 
Congress33 and the American people,34 and it was reevaluated in short 
order.35 
 
28 See, e.g., Graham-Felsen, supra note 10. 
29 Both the MCA09 and the March 13, 2009 detention definition submitted by the 
government abandoned the term “enemy combatant,” with the MCA09 using “enemy 
belligerent” in its stead. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-
07, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574-2614 (2009); see also Memorandum of Respondents, supra note 
27, at 1-3, 7, 8, 11-12.  
30 The success of the Obama administration in transferring and releasing detainees is 
debatable. As of April 2010, fifty-two detainees were released post-Boumediene, but the 
annualized number of releases dropped after the decision. Huq, supra note 14, at 408, 418. 
31 Id. at 405 (“Anecdotal information suggests that inflows to the base in fact largely 
dried up in 2004, after the Supreme Court’s first interventions in the field.”). 
32 Charlie Savage, Accused 9/11 Mastermind to Face Civilian Trial in N.Y., N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/us/14terror.html. 
33 Eighteen senators introduced an amendment to deny the Department of Justice 
funding for the trials, but it failed to get the sixty votes necessary for passage in November 
2009. There is press speculation that if offered again, the legislation may receive enough 
votes for passage. See Kasie Hunt, Senators Try to Block Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Trial, 
POLITICO, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/32382.html; Michael 
Isikoff, No KSM in NYC?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 16, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/ 
blogs/declassified/2010/01/15/no-ksm-in-nyc.html.  
34 See Lydia Saad, Americans at Odds With Recent Terror Trial Decisions, GALLUP 
(Nov. 27, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/124493/Americans-Odds-Recent-Terror-Trial-
Decisions.aspx?CSTS=tagrss (discussing a poll showing that a majority of Americans 
believed that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed should be tried by military commission outside of 
New York City, and were “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” that a trial would 
give KSM a forum to further his cause). 
35 Anne E. Kornblut & Peter Finn, Obama Advisers Set to Recommend Military 
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The Obama administration has avoided testing the breadth of 
executive detention power in two areas that the Bush administration at 
least initially embraced — the detention of both American citizens and 
permanent legal residents captured in the United States. In the Rumsfeld 
v. Padilla36 and al-Marri v. Pucciarelli 37 cases, respectively, the Bush 
administration detained a citizen and a permanent legal resident 
captured in the United States under the law of war. Padilla was litigated 
before the Supreme Court (and remanded on jurisdictional grounds)38 
before the Fourth Circuit affirmed the power of the executive to detain 
citizens captured in the United States.39 Before the case could reach the 
Supreme Court again, it was rendered moot by the Bush 
administration’s decision to transfer Padilla to the criminal justice 
system, albeit not without controversy.40 The Fourth Circuit opinion, 
however, was not vacated by the Supreme Court, so the judicially-
recognized power of the President to detain citizens captured in the 
United States remains on the books. 
In al-Marri, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the power of the President 
to detain legal permanent residents captured in the United 
States.41 Again, after certiorari had been granted by the Supreme Court, 
the case was rendered moot when the government, this time led by 
President Obama, transferred al-Marri to the criminal justice 
system.42 However, unlike Padilla, the Supreme Court vacated the 
Fourth Circuit decision in al-Marri.43 
Without Supreme Court guidance on Padilla and al-Marri, 
multiple questions regarding the extent of the President’s authority to 
detain combatants in the War on Terror remain. While the Fourth 
Circuit decision in Padilla still stands, whether the Supreme Court 
 
Tribunals for Alleged 9/11 Plotters, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2010, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/04/AR2010030405209.html. 
36 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004). 
37 al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam), 
vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009). 
38 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443. 
39 Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005). 
40 The Fourth Circuit denied the government’s motion to transfer Padilla to civilian law 
enforcement custody as an attempt to avoid Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court 
ultimately allowed the transfer. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 587 (4th Cir. 2005), 
overruled by Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084, 1084-85 (2006). 
41 Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d at 216. 
42 Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545. 
43 Compare id., with Padilla, 546 U.S. at 1084. 
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would ultimately ratify that decision remains up for debate. Likewise, 
with the Fourth Circuit decision in al-Marri vacated, it is unclear 
whether the President has the power to detain legal permanent residents 
captured in the United States as part of the ongoing conflict against Al 
Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. Further, it is uncertain if the 
President has that authority, whether that authority is derived from the 
AUMF, the President’s inherent authority under Article II of the 
Constitution, or both. 
A. Congressional Reaffirmation of Detention Authority 
Given the uncertainty in this area, Congress and the President 
should provide statutory guidance to the courts regarding their view of 
the President’s detention power. This need not be done in the form of a 
new congressional authorization, nor as an attempt to define the outer 
limits of the President’s inherent authority under Article II of the 
Constitution. Indeed, attempting the former would be politically 
impossible,44 and attempting the latter would be foolhardy, lest it bind 
the President in future conflicts. Instead, TDERRA would reaffirm the 
basic premise of the AUMF — that the United States is at war — and 
therefore the President is authorized to detain enemy belligerents as part 
of that war, regardless of the place of capture.45 
The statement of detention power is couched as a reaffirmation of 
the power that the AUMF already gives the President, not a new 
authorization, so as to dispel the impression that this is a new power and 
avoid a political firestorm over congressional broadening of the AUMF. 
This reaffirmation would demonstrate to the courts that Congress 
intended to provide the President with detention power in the AUMF, 
applicable to cases like Padilla and al-Marri. Whether the government 
should ever use that power to detain citizens or legal permanent 
residents captured in the United States as a matter of policy is a question 
for President Obama and future presidents. Congress and the President, 
though, should clarify the scope of the detention power in the AUMF 
and remove that consideration to the greatest extent possible from the 
 
44 Some in Congress have attempted to repeal the existing AUMF. See, e.g., Iraq War 
Powers Repeal Act of 2006, H.R. 5875, 109th Cong. (2006); see Shailagh Murray & 
Jonathan Weisman, Democrats Seek to Repeal 2002 War Authorization, WASH. POST, Feb. 
23, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/22/AR20070222 
01743.html. 
45 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2010). 
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judiciary. 46 Such a reaffirmation has been proposed in the past, and it 
should be considered anew.47 The AUMF was an authorization of power 
from one branch of the government, Congress, to another, the 
President.48 It is incumbent, therefore, upon those two branches to define 
the nature of that authorization. To this point, Congress and the 
President have purposefully avoided addressing the ambiguities in the 
AUMF on a statutory level, leaving its interpretation to the judiciary. 
Given the stakes involved, asking the judiciary to fill in the known holes 
of a vague authorization is unwise and shortsighted. 
B. Defining the Class of Detainable Individuals 
Beyond the source of detention authority, the Obama 
administration has also differed, albeit slightly, from the Bush 
administration’s claim of the scope of the power. While the Bush 
administration asserted that it had the power to detain both members 
and supporters of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces,49 the 
Obama administration altered the definition slightly to include members 
and “substantial[]” supporters.50 Historically, habeas courts interpreted 
 
46 See Cole, supra note 8, at 732 (discussing the problems caused by a lack of clarity as 
to the scope of executive detention power). Professor Cole has expressed this view:   
[T]he only congressional statement on [the scope of the detention power] is the 
AUMF, which does not even mention detention....If preventive detention of 
‘enemy combatants’ is to continue, it should be defined - and carefully 
circumscribed - by legislation. The power to hold a human being indefinitely is 
too grave to delegate to executive experimentation. Such a statute would have to 
address both the proper substantive scope of the detention power, and the 
procedural guarantees available to those subjected to it. 
Id.  
47 Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act of 2008, S. 3401, 110th Cong. (2008). 
48 Section 2(a) of the AUMF is an authorization to the President: 
(a) IN GENERAL- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by 
such nations, organizations or persons.  
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001). 
49 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the initial 
detention standard offered by the government). 
50 Id. at 870 n.1 (“[T]he government modified the definition in its initial habeas return 
to replace the term ‘support’ with ‘substantially supported.’”); Memorandum of 
Respondents, supra note 27, at 3.  
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the detention power in numerous ways. 51 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia (hereinafter “D.C. Circuit Court”) 
settled this issue — at least temporarily — by interpreting the AUMF as 
supporting both the Bush and Obama definitions of detainable 
individuals. 52 Ultimately, Al-Bihani held that under the MCA09, both 
members and supporters of enemy groups are subject to the jurisdiction 
of the military commissions system, and the executive’s detention 
power must be at least as broad as the jurisdictional basis of the 
MCA09.53 In an attempt to answer another question vexing the habeas 
courts, the extent of contact with enemy groups necessary to subject an 
individual to the detention authority, Al-Bihani stated that an individual 
lodging with, or participating in training with an enemy group would 
likely be sufficient.54 That interpretation was explicitly affirmed in Al-
Adahi v. Obama, which held that proof of a detainee staying at an Al 
Qaeda guesthouse and training at an Al Qaeda camp was 
“overwhelming” evidence in favor of detention.55 
TDERRA’s reaffirmation of detention authority would serve two 
purposes: 1) providing guidance to the judiciary that the AUMF 
authorizes the detention of citizens and permanent legal residents, 
regardless of the place of capture; and 2) defining the level of 
participation or contact with an enemy group necessary on the part of an 
individual to be subject to the detention authority. As previously 
discussed, the first goal could be accomplished without extending the 
 
51 Before Al-Bihani, district court judges differed in their interpretations of whether the 
AUMF allowed the detention of supporters of enemy groups and what constituted 
membership and support. See BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, 
BROOKINGS INST.,THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION, THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES 
AS LAWMAKING 18-20 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc 
/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf. 
52 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872. 
53 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872. The Court stated:   
The provisions of the 2006 and 2009 MCAs are illuminating in this case 
because the government’s detention authority logically covers a category of 
persons no narrower than is covered by its military commission authority. 
Detention authority in fact sweeps wider, also extending at least to traditional 
P.O.W.s... and arguably to other categories of persons. 
Id. at 872. 
54 Id. at 873 n.2 (“[E]vidence supporting the military’s reasonable belief of either 
[attending Al Qaeda training camps or visiting Al Qaeda guesthouses] with respect to a non-
citizen seized abroad during the ongoing war on terror would seem to overwhelmingly, if 
not definitively, justify the government’s detention …”). 
55 Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
KUHN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:31 PM 
2011 TERRORIST DETENTION REVIEW REFORM ACT 233 
existing AUMF, leaving the decision of whether, as a matter of policy, 
to detain citizens and legal permanent residents captured in the United 
States to President Obama and future presidents. Fulfilling the second 
goal would finally provide guidance to the judiciary as to the 
individuals Congress and the President view as sufficiently part of the 
enemy war effort to justify detention. 
In reaffirming the detention authority of the President, TDERRA 
defines the power as extending to an individual who: 1) has engaged in 
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; 2) has 
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners; or 3) was a member of, part of, or 
operated in a clandestine, covert, or military capacity on behalf of the 
Taliban, Al Qaeda, or associated forces.56 This definition is a melding of 
the Obama administration’s detention definition from March 13, 2009,57 
the “unprivileged enemy belligerent” definition from the MCA09,58 and 
new language designed to more clearly define the contacts and 
participation necessary to submit an individual to the government’s 
detention authority. 
The goal of TDERRA’s definition of the President’s detention 
power is clarification, not an extension of the detention power beyond 
what is already recognized by the courts. In addition to incorporating 
members of enemy groups and those who have engaged in hostilities 
against the United States or its partners, the proposed definition builds 
off the discussion in Al-Bihani: that the government’s detention 
authority extends at least as far as the jurisdictional basis of the 
MCA09, and that those training and boarding with enemy groups would 
likely be covered.59 Because individuals can be tried under the MCA09 
for “purposefully and materially supporting” an enemy group,60 it 
follows that such an action would be sufficient to trigger the 
government’s detention power. Similarly, as Al-Bihani and Al-Adahi 
indicate that those who train or lodge with enemy groups are subject to 
the government’s detention authority,61 surely those who “operate in a 
 
56 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (2010). 
57 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870 n.1; Memorandum of Respondents, supra note 27.  
58 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190, 2647 
(2009).  
59 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872-73. 
60 Military Commissions Act of 2009 § 1802. 
61 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2; Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). 
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clandestine, covert, or military capacity” for such groups would be 
covered.62 
C. Defining “associated forces” 
While defining the extent of contact that an individual must have 
with an enemy group to be covered under the President’s detention 
authority would help clarify the breadth of the detention power, 
Congress and the President should take the additional step of creating a 
system to define the “associated forces” hostile to the United States and 
its coalition. In short, this is the question of with whom the United 
States and its coalition forces are at war. As such, this question is 
properly answered by the political branches. There have been calls for 
the administration to publish a definitive list of organizations considered 
to be “associated forces.”63 A list would certainly offer some degree of 
simplicity and transparency. However, at least three potential problems 
would accompany the implementation of such a list. First, new groups 
may emerge at any time, necessitating last minute additions to the list, 
which would likely be met with skepticism by the judiciary. Second, 
there may be logistical problems within the bureaucracy in clearing a 
group for inclusion on the list, which would be imperative if the list was 
considered definitive. Third, the public nature of such a list, while 
having the benefit of transparency, could also cause foreign policy 
challenges if, for example, a particular group to be considered an 
“associated force” is not viewed similarly by a coalition partner or 
friendly host country. 
Instead of creating a comprehensive public list upon which the 
administration would rely in arguing to the courts that a particular 
organization is an “associated force” covered under the President’s 
detention power, TDERRA provides the administration with a statutory 
opportunity to certify to a habeas court that the administration considers 
a particular organization an “associated force[] of the Taliban or Al 
Qaeda.”64 In turn, the bill directs the judiciary to give such a 
 
62 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(6) (2010).  
63 See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES & COLLEEN A. PEPPARD, BROOKINGS INST., DESIGNING 
DETENTION, A MODEL LAW FOR TERRORIST INCAPACITATION 37 (2009), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0626_detention_wittes/0626_detent
ion_wittes.pdf. 
64 S. 3707, § 2(d). 
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determination by the executive “utmost deference.”65 Such a procedure 
would retain the traditional power of the executive to determine with 
whom the United States is in hostilities, while allowing the judiciary to 
review such a finding for blatant misuse. 
D. Potential Criticism of Detention Power Reaffirmation 
Critics of TDERRA’s reaffirmation of the President’s detention 
power would likely argue that any such proposal would be in danger of: 
1) establishing the outer bounds of the President’s inherent authority to 
detain enemy belligerents under Article II of the Constitution; or 2) 
expanding the statutory detention power granted in the AUMF. For the 
first, the concern on the political right that such a statute would bound 
the inherent authority of the President is relieved by a rule of 
construction that the statutory statement of authority should not be 
interpreted as limiting or affecting the inherent authority of the 
President under Article II.66 For the second, the concern on the political 
left would likely be that such a statute would amount to a new 
authorization giving the President detention powers that are not granted 
by the AUMF.67 The Fourth Circuit decision in Padilla that the 
President may detain an enemy belligerent citizen captured in the 
United States still stands,68 so Congress and the President should 
embrace that judicially sanctioned power. It is possible that different 
habeas procedures would apply to individuals captured in the United 
States, including a higher standard of proof.69 
Those on the political left would also likely argue that the proposed 
definition of “unprivileged enemy belligerent,” including its 
incorporation of those who “operated in a clandestine, covert, or 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. § 2(b)(3) (“The authority under this section shall not be construed to alter or limit 
the authority of the President under the Constitution of the United States to detain 
combatants in the continuing armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 
forces, or in any other armed conflict.”). 
67 See Huq, supra note 14, at 430 (lamenting that “the only kind of legislative action 
that could pass would expand detention authority and further restrict the fragmented and 
incomplete influence of habeas review.”). 
68 Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). 
69 In Al-Bihani, the D.C. Circuit Court refused to state the minimum standard of proof 
required for non-citizens captured abroad, let alone citizens or non-citizens captured in the 
United States. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“We 
emphasize our opinion does not endeavor to identify what standard would represent the 
minimum required by the Constitution.”). 
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military capacity” for enemy groups, would extend the detention power 
beyond the March 13, 2009, “substantial support” language.70 While it is 
true that TDERRA’s definition is broader than the March 13 definition, 
it is well within the confines of the discussion in Al-Bihani.71 As 
previously discussed, the interpretation in Al-Bihani that the President’s 
detention power extends at least as far as the jurisdictional basis of the 
MCA09, and that individuals who trained or lodged with enemy groups 
are likely covered by the detention power, currently controls the habeas 
cases being litigated in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia (hereinafter “D.C. District Court”). 
Some may argue that the extensive discussion of detention 
authority in Al-Bihani was dictum and that, in the end, the court ratified 
the administration’s detention definition.72 For example, in Salahi v. 
Obama, Judge Robertson stated that the standard approved in Al-Bihani 
was “those who purposefully and materially supported such forces in 
hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners.”73 In fact, while Al-Bihani 
stated that the detention power extends at least as broadly as the 
jurisdictional basis of the MCA09, the original standard argued by the 
government in that case covered those who were “part of or supporting 
 
70 S.3707 § 2(a)(6). The definitional framework of the government states:     
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for those 
attacks. The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, 
or substantially supported, Taliban or al Qaida forces or associated forces that 
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, 
including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly 
supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.  
Memorandum of Respondents, supra note 27, at 3.  
71 The jurisdictional basis of the MCA09 covers those who engaged in hostilities, 
purposefully and materially supported hostilities, and were part of Al Qaeda. The new 
language in the proposed definition, “was a member of, part of, or operated in a clandestine, 
covert, or military capacity on behalf of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces,” would 
be unlikely to encompass persons beyond the MCA09 definition, as “operating in a 
clandestine, covert, or military capacity” would overlap with “purposeful and material 
support.” See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 
2190, 2647 (2009).  
72 In regards to the Al-Bihani discussion on the force of international law, where the 
majority argued that “[t]he international laws of war as a whole have not been implemented 
domestically by Congress and are therefore not a source of authority for U.S. courts,” a 
similar dictum argument has been made, most notably in a concurring opinion. Cf. Al-
Bihani, 590 F.3d at 885 (Williams, J., concurring). 
73 Salahi v. Obama, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 
872), vacated, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in 
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,” and the 
ultimate standard replaced “support” with “substantially supported.”74 In 
any case, Judge Robertson misconstrues the standard to require the 
individual’s acts to be in support of the hostilities, rather than allowing 
the acts to be generally in support of a group which is engaged in 
hostilities. Judge Robertson goes so far as to explicitly criticize the 
decision in Al-Bihani that the detention authority is at least as broad as 
the jurisdictional basis of the MCA09.75 While Salahi is doubtless a 
notable post-Al-Bihani interpretation of the detention standard, it seems 
to be an outlier in that it is unlikely that other district court judges will 
disregard Al-Bihani’s strong statement in favor of a broad detention 
power. 
Regardless of the inevitable criticism by some on both sides of the 
political spectrum, Congress and the President should take the 
opportunity to create a lasting vision for the President’s detention power 
in the War on Terror. For too long, the judiciary has been forced to 
muddle through the most basic of detention questions — the extent of 
the power to detain — before even considering the more intricate details 
of habeas proceedings such as which evidence to allow, vitiation of 
membership, and the use of the mosaic theory, among others. Although 
some in favor of statutory procedural rules for habeas proceedings may 
oppose a statement of detention authority for various reasons, TDERRA 
would finally clarify the extent of the authority already granted to the 
President. 
II. HABEAS PROCEDURES 
The judges of the D.C. District Court who have been adjudicating 
Guantanamo detainees’ habeas petitions have not been shy in asking 
Congress for assistance in providing clear rules for those proceedings.76 
 
74 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 870 n.1. 
75 Salahi, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 5 n.4. In criticizing the Al-Bihani decision, Judge 
Robertson stated:   
The [Al-Bihani] panel concluded that ‘the government’s detention authority 
logically covers a category of persons no narrower than is covered by its 
military commission authority.’…Where, as here, the government clearly has no 
triable criminal case of ‘purposeful and material support’ against Salahi, the 
logic of that conclusion escapes me. 
Id. (internal citation omitted).  
76 See discussion supra note 9. 
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Of course, many commentators have long advocated for congressional 
input in these rules as well.77 Recognizing the potential problems with 
Boumediene’s open-ended invitation to trial courts to develop the 
operative habeas procedures,78 some in Congress attempted to establish 
statutory rules shortly after the decision, making their best guess about 
which issues would most benefit from congressional guidance.79 Basic 
issues, such as the burden of proof, scope of discovery, protection of 
classified information, proceeding logistics, and response to an order of 
release dominated one early proposal.80 Since that time, though, much 
has happened in the world of detainee litigation. As of December 31, 
2009, the courts had ruled on forty-one Guantanamo habeas cases, and 
fifty-two detainees had been released post-Boumediene, twenty-one of 
whom had prevailed in a habeas proceeding.81 In addition, the MCA09 
was signed into law,82 and extensive studies have been done on the 
evidentiary and procedural rules emerging from the D.C. District 
Court.83 From watching the process play out to this point and seeing the 
issues that have divided the district court judges, Congress is now in a 
much better position than it was in 2008 to enact rules governing 
detainee habeas proceedings. 
A. Covered Individuals 
The first question to answer when designing procedures to govern 
detainee habeas corpus petitions is to whom should the new procedures 
apply? Should legislation affect existing habeas petitions? Should the 
procedures apply only to current detainees at Guantanamo Bay, or 
should they also encompass other detainees, including individuals who 
have not yet been captured? 
TDERRA applies new habeas procedures to all petitions pending 
 
77 E.g., WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 7; Cole, supra note 8, at 745. 
78 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008) (“We make no attempt to anticipate 
all of the evidentiary and access-to-counsel issues that will arise during the course of the 
detainees’ habeas corpus proceedings….These and the other remaining questions are within 
the expertise and competence of the District Court to address in the first instance.”); see 
discussion supra note 17. 
79 E.g., Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act of 2008, S. 3401, 110th Cong. (2008). 
80 Id. § a(2). 
81 Huq, supra note 14, at 408. 
82 The MCA09 was signed into law on October 28, 2009. Warren Richey, Obama 
Endorses Military Commissions for Guantanamo Detainees, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 
29, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2009/1029/p02s01-usju.html. 
83 E.g. WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 18-20.  
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or filed on or after the date of enactment by individuals who are: 1) held 
by the United States at Guantanamo Bay or who the United States seeks 
to hold as an unprivileged enemy belligerent and 2) subject to the 
habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts.84 In practice, this would 
apply the new procedures to the current detainee population at 
Guantanamo Bay, any future detainees housed in Guantanamo Bay or 
the United States, and detainees held anywhere else that the courts 
extend habeas corpus. Since 2004, we have seen a halt in detainee 
transfers to Guantanamo Bay, 85 while detainees such as Padilla and al-
Marri have been transferred to the criminal justice system. Meanwhile, 
there have been no individuals held under the law of war in the United 
States. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible — and perhaps likely — 
that the United States will eventually find itself needing to hold new law 
of war detainees, whether at Guantanamo Bay, in the United States, or 
elsewhere. Similarly, although the D.C. Circuit Court rejected the 
extension of habeas corpus jurisdiction to Bagram, Afghanistan, in Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates,86 it is possible that the courts could extend 
extraterritorial habeas jurisdiction beyond Guantanamo in the future. In 
either case, TDERRA is designed with a backstop, so that its new 
procedures will automatically apply to individuals detained under the 
law of war wherever habeas jurisdiction exists. Like TDERRA’s 
proposed definition of the class of individuals covered by the 
President’s detention power, this provision applying the bill’s habeas 
procedures to future detainees held wherever habeas jurisdiction exists 
is not meant to institutionalize long-term military detention beyond the 
President’s already recognized power. It is merely meant to serve as a 
safety valve in case the courts extend habeas jurisdiction beyond its 
current geographic scope. 
Rather than simply cover those currently and in the future held as 
“unprivileged enemy belligerents,” TDERRA expressly mentions the 
population at Guantanamo Bay because of the recent change in 
nomenclature from “unlawful enemy combatant” to “unprivileged 
enemy belligerent.”87 Given that new status determinations for current 
 
84 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (2010). 
85 See Huq, supra note 14, at 405 (“Anecdotal information suggests that inflows to the 
base in fact largely dried up in 2004, after the Supreme Court’s first interventions in the 
field.”). 
86 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
87 See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-07, 123 Stat. 
2190, 2574-2614 (2009); see also Memorandum of Respondents, supra note 27, at 1-3, 7, 8, 
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detainees have not taken place after the terminology change, the 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay are arguably held as “unlawful enemy 
combatants,” which was the label given at their status determination, or 
“unprivileged enemy belligerents,” if the “unlawful enemy combatant” 
determination is seen as fluidly moving to the new label. Because of this 
uncertainty, TDERRA explicitly names the Guantanamo Bay detainee 
population as covered individuals. 
An argument could be made that Congress should not even hint in 
a statute that habeas jurisdiction extends further than Guantanamo Bay, 
lest the courts decide to interpret that as an invitation to do so. By 
applying the habeas procedures to all individuals detained as 
unprivileged enemy belligerents wherever habeas jurisdiction extends, 
Congress would not specifically mention detainees held in any 
particular part of the world, like Bagram. As such, it is unlikely that the 
courts would interpret such a provision as an invitation to extend habeas 
further than its current bounds. If such a provision was not included and 
habeas was extended or detainees were brought to the United States, 
different law of war detainees with access to habeas could be subject to 
different procedural rules based on their location. The benefit of having 
a backstop to prevent that outcome far outweighs the negligible danger 
of judges using the provision as a launching point for expanded habeas 
jurisdiction. 
B. Burden of Proof 
In Hamdi, the Supreme Court contemplated a burden shifting 
mechanism for determining whether an individual, including an 
American citizen, was lawfully held.88 First, the government would have 
to present “credible evidence” that the individual met the detention 
definition.89 Then, the detainee would have the opportunity to rebut with 
“more persuasive evidence.”90 A previous legislative attempt to provide 
procedural rules for the habeas proceedings used this burden-shifting 
structure.91 Judge Hogan, however, held that the government bears a 
 
11-12.  
88 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (“[O]nce the Government puts forth 
credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus 
could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he 
falls outside the criteria.”). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 While embracing the Hamdi burden-shifting framework, the Enemy Combatant 
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“preponderance of the evidence” burden in detainee habeas cases, 92 and 
the rest of the D.C. District Court has followed his lead.93 
Even the D.C. Circuit decision in Al-Bihani, while discussing the 
Hamdi standard and hinting that a “some evidence, reasonable 
suspicion, or probable cause” standard of proof may suffice 
constitutionally,94 argues that the Hamdi procedure “mirrors a 
preponderance standard.”95 As some have argued, that is likely only true 
if the “credible evidence” standard at the beginning of the Hamdi 
burden shifting mechanism is actually a “preponderance” standard.96 In 
Al-Adahi, the D.C. Circuit Court indicated a willingness to reconsider 
the preponderance standard as the applicable standard of proof.97 The 
court requested supplemental briefs on the issue, and both the detainee 
and government agreed that the preponderance standard was 
appropriate.98 The government argued that a different standard may be 
appropriate in a different case or context, but did not explain why that 
might be.99 The court exhibited clear skepticism of the Constitution 
requiring the preponderance standard,100 as it examined the evidentiary 
standards historically used, among them “some evidence” and “probable 
 
Detention Review Act of 2008 also required habeas courts to make findings of fact by “a 
preponderance of the evidence.” E.g. Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act of 2008, S. 
3401, 110th Cong. §2(d) (2008). 
92 Case Management Order, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442, 
2008 WL 4858241 at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008), amended by 2008 WL 5245890 at *1 
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Case Management Order] (“The government bears the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner’s detention is 
lawful.”); see Matthew C. Waxman, Guantanamo, Habeas Corpus, and Standards of Proof: 
Viewing the Law through Multiple Lenses, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 245, 247-48 (2009) 
(describing the back and forth between the government and detainees’ counsel before Judge 
Hogan). 
93 WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 13 (citing Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23-
24 (D.D.C. 2009); Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Odah v. 
Obama, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2009); Hatim v. Obama, No. 05-1429, slip op. at 31 
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 195-96 (D.D.C. 2008)).  
94 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
95 Id. at 878. 
96 E.g. WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 14. 
97 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
98 Id. at 1104-05. 
99 Id. at 1104. 
100 The court quoted Boumediene’s statement that the “extent of the showing required of 
the Government in these cases is a matter to be determined,” and charged that the district 
courts had accepted the preponderance standard without rationale. Id. (quoting Boumediene 
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008)). 
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cause.”
101
 While adopting the preponderance standard because of the 
lack of argument in favor of a more deferential standard, the court 
signaled to the government that a lesser standard may be permissible.102 
One wonders if, when confronted with the opportunity to argue for a 
lesser standard, the government decided that it would be better to adopt 
the preponderance standard than risk an appeal to the Supreme Court on 
the issue. 
Despite the hints in Al-Bihani and Al-Adahi that a lower 
evidentiary standard may be available, at this point, the district court 
judges have accepted the “preponderance” standard for the purposes of 
detainee habeas proceedings. Congress and the President would be wise 
to accept this as the standard because 1) it is unclear, as discussed in Al-
Bihani, whether a lower standard of proof would be constitutionally 
permissible,103 and 2) it would likely be politically impossible to 
statutorily create a lower standard for detention than the one currently 
being used, as many in Congress would not countenance a retreat from a 
standard of proof that has been uniformly accepted by the habeas courts. 
C. Evidentiary Presumptions 
In keeping with Hamdi’s burden-shifting vision of habeas 
proceedings, the government has repeatedly requested a presumption in 
favor of its evidence, as to both the authenticity and accuracy of the 
evidence.104 While some habeas judges have granted a presumption in 
favor of the authenticity of the government’s evidence, they have not 
accepted a presumption in favor of the accuracy of the government’s 
evidence.105 Doing so would counteract the standard of proof that the 
judges have accepted — a burden on the government to prove its case 
by a “preponderance of the evidence.”106 Just as TDERRA accepts the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard that the judges have installed, 
 
101 The court found that habeas proceedings contesting deportation and selective service 
decision used a “some evidence” standard, while proceedings contesting arrest used a 
“probable cause” standard. Id. 
102 Id. at 1105 (“Although we doubt…that the Suspension Clause requires the use of the 
preponderance standard…we will assume arguendo that the government must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Al-Adahi was part of al-Qaida.”). 
103 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
104 WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 32. 
105 Id. at 34 (citing Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2009); Hatim 
v. Obama, No. 05-1429, slip. op. at 13 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2009)). 
106 Id. 
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it also provides for a presumption in favor of the authenticity of the 
government’s evidence, but not for the evidence’s accuracy.107 
D. Mosaic Theory 
The “mosaic theory” of evidence demonstrates the tension between 
intelligence gathering for the purposes of the executive branch and 
evidence gathering for the purpose of satisfying a judicial burden of 
proof. Under the mosaic theory, the “mosaic” of disparate pieces of 
information may in aggregate prove more than the sum of the individual 
pieces of evidence.108 Stated differently, it is a “rough analogue for the 
use in courts of circumstantial evidence,”109 and “the evidence meshes 
together to demonstrate” detainability.110 For example, in a case in which 
an individual lodged with an enemy group and associated with known 
members of that group for an extended period of time, the government 
might argue that the evidence viewed as a whole shows that the 
individual falls under the executive’s detention authority. 
Given that the intelligence community commonly uses the mosaic 
theory to analyze information,111 and information from the intelligence 
community is used by the government to satisfy the burden of proof in 
detainee habeas cases, a rejection of the mosaic theory by the judiciary 
could hamstring the administration. In some cases, the D.C. District 
Court has rejected the mosaic approach and the government’s argument 
in favor of examining the “evidence as a whole.”112 While recognizing 
the difference between evidence that the intelligence community and the 
courts might find satisfactory,113 in some cases the district court has 
 
107 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(1)(D) (2010). But see Enemy Combatant Detention 
Review Act of 2008, S. 3401, 110th Cong. § 2(d) (2008) (providing a presumption in favor 
of both the accuracy and authenticity of the government’s evidence, and also adopting the 
Hamdi burden shifting framework, rather than a straight “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard).  
108 WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 61 (quoting David Pozen, Note, The Mosaic 
Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 
(2005)). 
109 Id. 
110 Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2009). 
111 Id. at 56 (“[U]se of the mosaic approach is a common and well-established mode of 
analysis in the intelligence community.”). 
112 Mohammed v. Obama, 689 F. Supp. 2d 38, 44 (D.D.C. 2009). 
113 Ali Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (“The kind and amount of evidence which satisfies 
the intelligence community in reaching final conclusions about the value of information it 
obtains may be very different, and certainly cannot govern the Court’s ruling.”). 
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indicated that evidence must “be carefully analyzed-major-issue-in-
dispute by major-issue-in-dispute-since the whole cannot stand if its 
supporting components cannot survive scrutiny.”114 The D.C. Circuit 
Court harshly criticized the district court’s decision to analyze each 
piece of evidence individually without considering their inter-
relationship.115 While not describing use of the mosaic theory as such, 
the D.C. Circuit Court stressed that the evidence should be considered 
as a whole, rather than as individual pieces standing alone.116 
Statutorily enforcing use of the mosaic approach in detainee habeas 
cases is difficult at best and impossible at worst. Judges will decide for 
themselves the weight of particular evidence and whether the 
government has proven its case by a preponderance of the evidence. At 
a minimum, however, Congress should provide that district courts 
should consider the “totality of the circumstances” and the “evidence as 
a whole” in determining whether the government has met its burden. 
Hamdi and Boumediene both encourage habeas courts to consider the 
special circumstances of these cases in devising the procedural rules.117 
When the government collects information on individuals involved in 
these cases, it is usually with an eye toward analysis by the intelligence 
community rather than the judiciary.118 Congress and the President 
should be cognizant of the different modes of analysis that are utilized 
by the intelligence community and judiciary, and TDERRA attempts to 
bridge that gap by directing district courts to consider the evidence as a 
whole when determining whether the government satisfied its burden of 
proof.119 
 
114 Mohammed, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 67. 
115 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
116 Id. 
117 E.g. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795-96 (2008) (“Certain accommodations 
can be made to reduce the burden habeas corpus proceedings will place on the military 
without impermissibly diluting the protections of the writ.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 533 (2004) (“[T]he exigencies of the circumstances may demand that…enemy-
combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the 
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”).  
118 As Professor Waxman argues, while questioned by some courts, mosaic evidence is 
used in a variety of other very important contexts, including informing life and death 
decisions. See Waxman, supra note 92, at 260-61 (“[I]t is sometimes those same 
‘intelligence purposes’ viewed skeptically by the courts upon which the executive relies in 
making decisions of enormous military and humanitarian or liberty consequences. These 
include detention decisions in Afghanistan….[and] the application of lethal force.”). 
119 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(1)(D) (2010). 
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E. Presumptions Related to Membership 
The issue of vitiation is most vividly demonstrated in Salahi. In 
that post-Al-Bihani case, the detainee was alleged, among other actions, 
to have recruited two of the 9/11 hijackers and a coordinator of the plot 
to Al Qaeda.120 While denying that he was a recruiter for the 
organization, Salahi conceded that he swore bayat to Al Qaeda and 
waged jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.121 Salahi argued 
that his association with Al Qaeda ended after 1992, well before his 
capture by the United States in 2001.122 
In considering the habeas petition, Judge Robertson rejected the 
government’s argument that Salahi was covered under the “purposeful 
and material support” prong of the detention definition because any 
support he provided to Al Qaeda was sporadic, not occurring at the time 
of his capture, and not in furtherance of hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners.123 Judge Robertson determined that he 
would consider Salahi’s support in determining whether he was “part 
of” Al Qaeda, applying Judge Bates’ test from Hamlily v. Obama, 
namely, “whether the individual functions or participates within or 
under the command structure of the organization — i.e., whether he 
receives and executes orders or directions.”124 Salahi goes on to state 
that an individual may be “part of” an enemy organization even if he 
never fights for it.125 Even a cook may be “part of” an enemy 
organization if he received and executed orders.126 Further, Salahi 
recognized that under Al-Bihani, a sympathizer outside of the command 
structure may be “part of” the organization without having “[t]aken 
direct part in the hostilities.”127 
The crux of the issue in Salahi, though, is determining when an 
individual must be a “part of” an enemy organization to be detainable, 
as it was undisputed that Salahi was a sworn member of Al Qaeda in the 
 
120 Salahi v. Obama, 710 F.Supp.2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2010), vacated, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). 
121 Id. at 4, 9-10. 
122 Id. at 10. 
123 Id. at 4-5. 
124 Id. at 5 (citing Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009); Awad v. 
Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009)). 
125 Id. at 4-5 (citing Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
126 Salahi, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (citing Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 69 n.19 
(D.D.C. 2009)). 
127 Id. 
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early 1990s.128 Judge Robertson determined that it was not sufficient to 
prove that an individual was a member of an enemy group at some 
point.129 Instead, the government bore the burden of proving that Salahi 
was “part of” Al Qaeda at the time of capture — November 2001, in 
Salahi’s case.130 Judge Robertson explicitly rejected the government’s 
argument that once it proves that a detainee was a member of an enemy 
group at some point in the past, the burden shifts to the individual to 
prove affirmative acts of disassociation from that group.131 Instead, 
Salahi stands for the proposition that the government must prove that a 
detainee was “part of” an enemy group at the time of capture, and even 
if the individual was clearly “part of” the group at an earlier point, he 
need not prove overt acts of disassociation. 
In sum, Salahi granted release to an individual who had — at least 
at one point in time — sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda, fought for the 
organization in Afghanistan, allegedly recruited participants in the 9/11 
attacks (Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah),132 and 
who was connected to Mohamed Atta by the 9/11 Commission 
Report.133 This release was based on a finding that the United States 
government could not prove his detainability on the date of capture. The 
D.C. Circuit Court ultimately vacated and remanded Salahi because the 
district court treated its inquiry into whether Salahi received and 
executed orders as dispositive as to whether he was a “part of” Al 
Qaeda.134 Salahi conflicted with the D.C. Circuit’s later decisions in 
Bensayah v. Obama and Awad v. Obama, which clarified that the 
determination of whether an individual is “part of” an enemy 
organization “must be made on a case-by-case basis” and participation 
in a group’s command structure is sufficient but not necessary for such 
a conclusion.135 The appellate court did not, however, object to Judge 
 
128 Id. at 3. 
129 Id. at 5-6. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 6 n.7 (“I have rejected the government’s broadest assertion, that Salahi’s 
concession of al-Qaida membership in the early 1990’s shifted the burden of proof, 
requiring that he prove affirmative acts of dis-association to show that he was not a member 
in 2001.”).  
132 Salahi, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 10.  
133 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S.,THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 165-66 (2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.   
134 Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
135 Id. at 752-53 (quoting Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010); 
Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
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Robertson’s refusal to shift the burden of proof to the defendant to 
prove vitiation.136 
Even before Salahi, habeas judges took differing approaches to the 
vitiation issue. Four judges ruled that the government may not detain 
someone whose relationship with an enemy group ended before 
capture.137 The test employed by the judges considered the nature of the 
relationship in the first instance, the nature of intervening events or 
conduct, and the amount of time that elapsed between the relationship 
and initial custody.138 Judge Hueville held that a detainee may even 
vitiate his relationship with an enemy group after capture, and that in 
that circumstance, a habeas court should consider the detainee’s 
likelihood of rejoining the enemy.139 The idea that a detainee can — 
while detained — reform, terminate his relationship with an enemy 
group, and separate himself from his pre-capture activity such that he 
would no longer be detainable, would almost certainly be rejected by 
the political branches. While political leaders viewing the habeas 
process from the outside may see an obvious answer to such issues, 
without statutory guidance, it should come as no surprise that district 
court judges come to varied conclusions. 
Ironically, the same judge who authored the Salahi opinion, Judge 
Robertson, previously held that an individual’s detainability turned not 
on future dangerousness, but on whether the individual was a member 
of an enemy group for some period of time.140 In that case, Judge 
Robertson did not confront the vitiation issue, but he hinted that even 
pre-capture vitiation may not remove an individual from the 
government’s detention power.141 This decision, of course, stands in 
 
136 The Court of Appeals recognized that shifting the burden to detainees to show 
vitiation “may be warranted in some cases,” but determined that Salahi’s 1991 membership 
in Al Qaeda was “insufficiently probative of his relationship with al-Qaida at the time of his 
capture in November 2001 to justify shifting the burden.” Id. at 751. 
137 Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 2009); Khan v. Obama, 646 
F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2009); Hatim v. Obama, No. 05-1429, slip op. at 18 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 
2009); Al Adahi, No. 05-0280, slip op. at 40-42 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2009).  
138 WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 26 (citing Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 130; Hatim, 
No. 05-1429, slip op. at 18; Al Adahi, No. 05-0280, slip op. at 40-42).   
139 See Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[T]he AUMF 
does not authorize the detention of individuals beyond that which is necessary to prevent 
those individuals from rejoining the battle, and it certainly cannot be read to authorize 
detention where its purpose can no longer be attained.”). 
140 Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). 
141 WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 31. 
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stark contrast to Judge Robertson’s opinion in Salahi, which held not 
only that pre-capture vitiation is a valid basis for determining that a 
individual is not detainable, but also that a detainee need not 
affirmatively prove acts of vitiation, despite ample evidence that a 
strong prior association with an enemy group existed.142 As Salahi and 
Awad show, without statutory guidance, the same judge may come to 
differing conclusions on these difficult detention issues in different 
cases, let alone the variety of opinions that may exist among different 
judges. 
After Salahi, Judge Robertson expounded upon his vitiation rule in 
Khalifh v. Obama.143 While denying the habeas petition of a detainee he 
determined to be “part of” Al Qaeda on several evidentiary bases, Judge 
Robertson stated that a petitioner who was once a member of an enemy 
group can prove vitiation by showing that he took affirmative steps to 
abandon his membership.144 Citing Salahi, the court also declared that a 
petitioner can show a lapse of membership without an affirmative act of 
severance if the evidence that the membership lapsed is “credible and 
significant.”145 The court notes, however, that the proposition of vitiation 
without proof of an affirmative act of separation rests on the unusual 
facts of Salahi — “a gap of nearly a decade between [Salahi’s] activity 
in and his subsequent capture.”146 This indicates that a finding of 
vitiation absent proof of affirmative acts of disassociation will be an 
exception to the rule on vitiation, rather than the rule itself. 
TDERRA confronts the vitiation issue by providing that once the 
government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
detainee was an unprivileged enemy belligerent at a particular time 
before capture,147 there is a rebuttable presumption that the detainee 
remained an unprivileged enemy belligerent at the time of capture.148 To 
rebut the presumption, a detainee would be required to show that he 
withdrew from the organization prior to capture.149 Habeas courts would 
 
142 Salahi v. Obama, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 n.7 (D.D.C. 2010), vacated, 625 F.3d 745 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). 
143 Khalifh v. Obama, No. 05-CV-1189, 2010 WL 2382925, at *2 (D.D.C. May 28, 
2010). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. (citing Salahi, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 6 n.7).  
146 Id. 
147 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(1)(E)(ii) (2010). 
148 Id. § 2(e)(1)(E)(ii)(I). 
149 Id. § 2(e)(1)(E)(ii)(II). 
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reject any argument that a detainee withdrew from an enemy 
organization after capture.150 
This provision would solve the Salahi problem by requiring 
detainees to affirmatively prove that they withdrew from an enemy 
organization. Courts should not allow the absence of evidence of 
membership at the time of capture to eclipse substantial evidence from 
prior membership. While individuals must be allowed to prove that they 
reformed from prior associations with enemy groups, the government is 
entitled to some deference in using evidence of prior membership to 
prove detainability at the time of capture. This type of burden-shifting 
mechanism strikes the appropriate balance in proving membership in an 
enemy group at the time of capture. 
With regard to consideration of post-capture vitiation in habeas 
proceedings, some may argue that a detainee should be able to contend 
that he has sufficiently separated himself from an enemy group such 
that rejoining the battle is unlikely. Like a common criminal presenting 
to a parole board, as the argument goes, detainees should be able to 
attempt to persuade a habeas judge that he has reformed and will not 
recidivate. Habeas proceedings are inquiries into the lawfulness of 
detention, though, and whether a detainee has reformed post-
apprehension is immaterial to that consideration. Also, unlike common 
criminals pleading that they will not act unlawfully again, members of 
enemy groups are attached by ideology, in addition to actions. 
Regardless, post-apprehension vitiation is irrelevant to the question of 
whether detention is lawful. The proper venue for such an argument 
would be an administrative review board inquiring whether a detainee 
continues to pose a threat to the national security of the United States.151 
Building off Al-Bihani’s reasoning that a non-citizen captured 
abroad who trained at enemy camps would almost certainly be 
detainable,152 TDERRA also provides that upon a showing that an 
individual knowingly obtained training from an enemy group, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the individual is an “unprivileged enemy 
 
150 Id. § 2(e)(1)(E)(ii)(III). 
151 See infra text accompanying note 242. 
152 See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[E]vidence 
supporting the military’s reasonable belief of either [attending Al Qaeda training camps or 
visiting Al Qaeda guesthouses] with respect to a non-citizen seized abroad during the 
ongoing war on terror would seem to overwhelmingly, if not definitively, justify the 
government’s detention …”). 
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belligerent.”153 This would settle the question of whether training with 
the enemy is alone sufficient to render an individual detainable. Habeas 
judges struggled with this issue before Al-Bihani’s clear suggestion 
(explicitly affirmed in Al-Adahi) that training with the enemy is 
sufficient to bring a person under the detention power. For example, 
Judge Bates and others have considered training (and other support) 
only in terms of determining whether an individual was “part of” an 
enemy organization.154 Similarly, Judge Urbina has required the 
government to prove that an individual participated in the command 
structure of an enemy organization, with proof of training alone being 
insufficient to prove the ability to detain.155 While the recent rulings in 
Al-Bihani and Al-Adahi may have clarified this issue for the district 
courts, Congress and the President should take the opportunity to affirm 
the view in those cases that training at an enemy camp alone is 
sufficient to trigger the executive’s detention authority. 
F. Discovery and Classified Information Protection 
The extent of discovery rights and treatment of classified 
information in detainee habeas cases are of special national security and 
political importance.156 If Congress and the President reform the 
applicable habeas procedures, defining the extent of discovery and 
bolstering the protection of classified information are two critical 
national security issues that must be proactively addressed. 
Comprehensive reform should address discovery and classified 
information procedures to mitigate the potential for damaging leaks, 
prevent the possibility of a judge allowing open-ended fishing 
expeditions into sensitive government information, and take the 
contentious political issue off the table. 
The Bismullah v. Gates decision interpreting the discovery 
 
153 S. 3707, § 2(e)(1)(E)(i). 
154 WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 19 (citing Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 
75 (D.D.C. 2009); Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 2009); Awad v. Obama, 
646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 85 
(D.D.C. 2009); Mattan v. Obama, 618 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2009)). 
155 Id. at 19 (citing Hatim v. Obama, 667 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2009)). 
156 See Attorney Gen. Michael Mukasey, Remarks Prepared Before the American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (July 21, 2008) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2008/ag-speech-0807213.html (“For the sake of 
national security, we cannot turn habeas corpus proceedings into a smorgasbord of classified 
information for our enemies.”). 
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obligations in the review process of the DTA provides the most vivid 
example of the legal and political imperativeness of addressing 
discovery and classified information protection in legislation reforming 
habeas procedures.157 Under the DTA, the D.C. Circuit Court had 
jurisdiction for a limited review of detainee status determinations.158 In 
Bismullah, a D.C. Circuit Court panel held that in the DTA review 
process, the government’s production of information from the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (hereinafter “CSRTs”) was 
insufficient for “meaningful” review.159 Instead, the court required the 
Department of Defense and other government agencies to produce a 
wide array of information about detainees,160 leading to fears of sensitive 
classified information leaks, fishing expeditions into government files 
by detainee lawyers, and a debilitating logistical challenge for the 
Department of Defense and the intelligence agencies.161 Ultimately, of 
course, DTA review was eclipsed by the habeas right in Boumediene,162 
and classified information problems have been relatively inconspicuous 
in the habeas process. Nevertheless, detainees have cited Bismullah for 
the proposition that the government must search all “reasonably 
available” information and disclose more than is required under habeas 
case management orders.163 As Bismullah was based on a now-defunct 
 
157 Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007), vacated, 554 U.S. 913 (2008). 
158 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 
2741-44 (2005). 
159 Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 180. 
160 The court stated:  
[T]he record on review consists of all the information a [CSRT] is authorized to 
obtain and consider… ‘such reasonably available information in the possession 
of the U.S. Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee meets the 
criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant,’ which includes any 
information presented to the Tribunal by the detainee or his Personal 
Representative. 
 Id. 
161 See Lyle Denniston, Government Duty in Detainee Cases Narrowed, SCOTUSBLOG, 
(Oct. 3, 2007, 6:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/10/government-duty-in-detainee-
cases-narrowed/ (describing the government’s reaction to the Bismullah decision as 
“strongly worded statements by all top-echelon intelligence officials, warn[ing] that the July 
20 decision would impose a mountainous burden on the government to gather all 
information in any agency’s hands about detainees — a task which would divert officials 
from such critical tasks as waging the ‘war on terrorism.’”).  
162 But see Huq, supra note 14, at 10 (arguing that Detainee Treatment Act review after 
Bismullah was so broad that Boumediene “was only a change in the kind of judicial 
oversight, not an absolute shift in its availability.”). 
163 E.g., Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 723-24 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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review system under the DTA, such claims made by detainees have 
failed.164 If Congress is to broadly reform the habeas procedures, though, 
it must concomitantly shore up the discovery and classified information 
procedures. This is necessary to ensure the protection of our national 
security interests, and avoid the possible firestorm of another 
Bismullah-type decision. 
The case management order governing most detainee habeas 
proceedings compels the government to disclose “all reasonably 
available evidence in its possession that tends materially to undermine 
the information presented to support the government’s justification for 
detaining the petitioner.”165 “Reasonably available evidence” means 
“evidence contained in any information reviewed by attorneys preparing 
factual returns for all detainees,” as well as “any other evidence the 
government discovers while litigating habeas corpus petitions filed by 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay.”166 In addition, if requested by the 
detainee,167 the government must disclose: 
1. any documents and objects in the government’s possession that the 
government relies on to justify detention; 
2. all statements, in whatever form, made or adopted by the 
petitioner that the government relies on to justify detention; and 
3. information about the circumstances in which such statements of 
the petitioner were made or adopted.”168 
TDERRA defines detainees’ discovery rights as the ability to 
review: 
i) any documents or objects directly and specifically referenced in 
the return submitted by the Government; 
ii) any evidence known to the attorney for the Government that tends 
materially to undermine evidence presented in the return submitted 
by the Government; and 
 
164 Id.  
165 In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 5245890, at *1 
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008); Case Management Order, supra note 92, at *1.  
166 In re Guantanamo Bay Litigation, 2008 WL 5245890, at *1. 
167 Discovery requests must be:  
(1) be narrowly tailored, not open-ended; (2) specify the discovery sought; (3) 
explain why the request, if granted, is likely to produce evidence that 
demonstrates that the petitioner’s detention is unlawful; and (4) explain why the 
requested discovery will enable the petitioner to rebut the factual basis for his 
detention without unfairly disrupting or unduly burdening the government.  
Case Management Order, supra note 92, at *2.  
168 Id. at *2. 
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iii) all statements, whether oral, written, or recorded, made or 
adopted by the covered individual that are known to the attorney for 
the Government and directly related to the information in the return 
submitted by the Government.169 
The two filters of this discovery obligation are: 1) whether the 
attorney for the government, rather than anyone in the government, 
knows of its existence, and 2) the information sought by the detainee 
must relate to the information in the government’s return. 
The first filter in this discovery formulation prevents the sort of 
open-ended obligation contemplated by Bismullah on the part of the 
government’s agencies and actors to exhaustively sort through all of its 
information on a particular detainee.170 If the attorney for the 
government is not aware of a particular piece of information, but a low-
level intelligence analyst is, the government is not required to produce 
the information. More important perhaps than preventing the production 
of the information in that situation is that the government is not 
obligated to determine whether the low-level intelligence analyst knows 
of the information. It is that type of exhaustive search for information 
that the government argued would be debilitating after Bismullah. 
The second filter is that the information sought by the detainee 
must relate to the information in the government’s return. Like the first 
filter, this requirement removes the government’s obligation to 
exhaustively sort through all of its information, which could be spread 
throughout different agencies, on a particular detainee. In creating its 
return, the government could limit its discovery obligation to known 
and related information. This certainty would protect sensitive 
information, speed the process to the benefit of both the government 
and the detainee, and be contrary to the much criticized mandate in 
Bismullah. 
TDERRA’s provisions concerning the protection of classified 
information strive to: 1) protect classified information from all 
disclosure to unprivileged enemy belligerents, 2) provide the petitioner 
or his cleared attorney with access to the information necessary to 
 
169 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(2)(A) (2010). 
170 In its later denial of the government’s motion for rehearing, the D.C. Circuit held 
that the government’s disclosure obligation was not as broad as the government feared, but 
only to the information that was “reasonably available.” But see Bismullah v. Gates, 503 
F.3d 137, 141 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The Government, it seems is overreading Bishmullah I . . . 
. A search for information without regard to whether it is ‘reasonably available’ is clearly 
not required by Bismullah I.”). 
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present their case, either in unclassified substitute or original classified 
form, respectively, 3) safeguard classified sources and methods of 
intelligence gathering, 4) allow ex parte and in camera review of a 
government motion to protect certain classified information, and 5) 
allow the government the right to interlocutory appeal of a decision 
relating of the trial court relating to the disclosure of classified 
information.171 These goals are largely the same as those of the case 
management order currently governing most detainee habeas petitions.172 
For national security reasons, the protection of classified information 
must be absolutely paramount in these proceedings. Detainees should be 
provided relevant, unclassified information to the extent that doing so is 
consistent with protecting national security. Detainees’ cleared counsel 
should be privy to appropriate classified information necessary to make 
his or her client’s case. However, proponents can bolster their argument 
for reform by ensuring that classified sources and methods are protected 
from disclosure, enemy belligerents are not provided with any classified 
information,173 and the government retains procedural options as a 
backstop against the inappropriate disclosure of classified information. 
Indeed, without strong classified information provisions, comprehensive 
reform would almost certainly not become law. 
G. Witness Production 
One persistent fear of Boumediene critics was that United States 
soldiers and intelligence officers would be called off the battlefield to 
testify in habeas proceedings for Guantanamo detainees.174 In practice, 
the petitions have been primarily adjudicated on the basis of written 
submissions.175 Like the proposed classified information section, 
 
171 S. 3707, § 2(e)(2)(B). 
172 In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 5245890, at *2 
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2008); 
173 Those concerned about the disclosure of classified information in detainee habeas 
cases often cite the 1995 prosecution of Omar Abdel Rahman, when the unindicted co-
conspirators list made its way to Osama Bin Laden. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723, 829-30 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
174 Id. (“One escalation of procedures that the Court is clear about is affording the 
detainees increased access to witnesses (perhaps troops serving in Afghanistan?) and to 
classified information.”). 
175 But see Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Major Fight Brews on Munaf, SCOTUSBLOG, 
(July 1, 2010, 8:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/07/analysis-major-fight-brews-
on-munaf/ (discussing Mohammed, a case in which Judge Kessler ordered “the top U.S. 
diplomat in charge of detainee transfers to other countries” to testify regarding a proposed 
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addressing the potential for soldiers and intelligence officers to be 
called off the battlefield to testify is critical for national security 
reasons. TDERRA explicitly provides that to the maximum extent 
possible, detainee habeas petitions will be adjudicated on the basis of 
the written returns and declarations, and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and their civil counterpart do not control.176 Further, the 
district court may only require oral testimony if it “finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that military and intelligence operations would not 
be harmed by the production of the witness and oral testimony would be 
likely to provide a material benefitFalse”177 These provisions should 
allay fears that adjudicating detainee habeas claims will harm military 
and intelligence operations and clarify for judges the evidentiary basis 
upon which to make findings. 
H. Hearsay 
The Supreme Court expressly invited the use of hearsay evidence 
in Hamdi.178 Before Al-Bihani, habeas judges agreed that hearsay needed 
to be reliable to factor into the court’s analysis, but disagreed on 
whether the evidence’s reliability is a threshold matter of admissibility, 
or simply relevant to the weight to be given the evidence.179 The D.C. 
Circuit Court settled this issue in Al-Bihani by holding that all hearsay 
is admissible, and reliability is relevant only to the weight to be given to 
the evidence.180 In doing so, Al-Bihani noted that an inquiry into the 
reliability of hearsay evidence, rather than its admissibility, comports 
with the requirements of Hamdi and the fact that district court judges 
are sophisticated finders of fact.181 TDERRA embraces this holding by 
providing that in detainee habeas proceedings the district court may 
review all probative evidence, including hearsay, and an inquiry into the 
reliability of hearsay evidence is only relevant to the probative weight 
 
transfer, and the D.C. Circuit Court barred Judge Kessler from requiring such testimony.). 
176 S. 3707, § 2(e)(3)(A). 
177 Id. § 2(e)(3)(B). 
178 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (“Hearsay, for example, may need 
to be accepted as the most reliable evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.”). 
179 WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 35. 
180 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he question a habeas 
court must ask when presented with hearsay is not whether it is admissible—it is always 
admissible— but what probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it 
exhibits.”). 
181 Id. at 880. 
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of the evidence, rather than its admissibility.182 
I. Coerced Statements 
One criticism of the military commissions established by the 
MCA06 was that some evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment could be admitted if they had sufficient reliability 
and probative value.183 The MCA06 did not completely exclude this type 
of statement from consideration.184 It is possible that a military judge 
would not have allowed such evidence to be admitted, but the 
government would not rule out its use.185 The issue was eventually 
resolved by a statutory change in the MCA09,186 but not before it 
festered and persuaded some that military commissions in general were 
illegitimate proceedings. The decision by the government not to rule out 
using evidence obtained through cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
not only damaged the military commissions authorized by the MCA06, 
but also fostered misperceptions and mistrust about the reformed 
commissions authorized by the MCA09. Even after passage of the 
MCA09, critics misunderstand the constitutional requirements for the 
commissions and assail the provisions related to voluntariness and 
 
182 S. 3707, § 2(e)(3)(A). Contra Cole, supra note 8, at 743 (“[H]earsay should be 
admitted only where it is ‘the most reliable available evidence’ and its use does not defeat 
the detainee’s meaningful opportunity to defend himself.”).  
183 Senator Feingold expressed this criticism during a congressional debate:   
According to the legislation, statements obtained through cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment, as long as it was obtained prior to December 2005, when 
the McCain amendment became law, would apparently be admissible in many 
instances in these military commissions. Now, it is true that the bill would 
require the commission to find these statements have sufficient and probative 
value. But why would we go down this road of trying to convict people based 
on statements obtained through cruel, inhuman, or degrading interrogation 
techniques? Either we are a nation that stands against this type of cruelty and for 
the rule of law or we are not. We cannot have it both ways.  
109 CONG. REC. S10,360 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
184 While barring the admission of statements obtained by torture, the MCA06 created a 
bifurcated system for admission of other statements, where statements obtained after 
enactment of the DTA were barred if resulting from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190, 2580 
(2009). 
185 See The Legal Rights of Guantanamo Detainees: What Are They, Should They Be 
Changed, and Is an End in Sight?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and 
Homeland Sec., S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 11-12 (2007) (statement of Gen. 
Thomas W. Hartmann). 
186 §1802, 123 Stat. at 2580.  
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coerced testimony, as well as the legitimacy of military commissions in 
general.187 
TDERRA adopts the express exclusion of statements obtained 
through torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the 
MCA09.188 As previously discussed, the potential use of such statements 
was a longstanding criticism of military commissions before the 
MCA09. In any comprehensive reform, legislation adopting rules 
favorable to the government, Congress and the President would be wise 
to expressly prohibit the use of such statements to prevent similar 
complaints. 
J. Voluntariness 
 Like many other issues, habeas judges have applied multiple tests 
to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary (and thus, admissible 
and inadmissible) statements.189 All judges agree that being in long-term 
detention without access to counsel does not in-and-of-itself render 
statements inadmissible.190 They also agree that prior abuse can taint 
subsequent statements and that the “totality of the circumstances” 
controls whether a statement is voluntary and admissible.191 Judges 
differ, though, on what is to be considered in the “totality of the 
circumstances” test.192 While the passage of time and the question of 
whether the circumstances of interrogation have changed are common 
inquiries in the “totality of circumstances” test; other factors such as 
interrogators’ knowledge of prior statements made pursuant to abuse, 
 
187 E.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, House Passes Changes To 
Guantanamo Military Comm’ns (Oct. 8, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/national-
security/house-passes-changes-guantanamo-military-commissions. The American Civil 
Liberties Union is one such critic:   
The [MCA09] revises the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to remove some of 
its worst violations of due process, but the legislation still falls far short of the 
requirements imposed by the Constitution and Geneva Conventions.… [I]t does 
not completely bar all coerced testimony as required by the Constitution…. 
[T]he military commissions, even as reconstituted, are inherently illegitimate 
and should be shut down for good…. Because of their tainted history, these 
proceedings, if carried on in any form, would continue to be stigmatized as 
unfair and inadequate, would be plagued by delay and controversy. 
Id.  
188 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(4)(A) (2010). 
189 WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 51. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 52. 
192 Id. 
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have also been considered.193 One judge has required compliance with 
the Army Field Manual and Geneva Conventions for statements to be 
admissible,194 and another has questioned the reliability of statements 
merely made at a site where abuse was taking place, regardless of 
whether the abuse involved the detainee in question.195 
The MCA09 allows the admission of detainee statements upon a 
finding that “the statement was made incident to lawful conduct during 
military operations at the point of capture or during closely related 
active combat engagement, and the interests of justice would best be 
served by admission of the statement” or “the statement was voluntarily 
given.”196 The first avenue of admission — a finding that a statement 
was made incident to lawful conduct at the point of capture or soon 
thereafter — was created in recognition of the fact that military 
activities are inherently coercive to some degree, and statements given 
on the battlefield deserve special dispensation when considering 
voluntariness. 
If the first avenue does not apply, the commission will consider: 
1. The details of the taking of the statement, accounting for the 
circumstances of the conduct of military and intelligence operations 
during hostilities. 
2. The characteristics of the accused, such as military training, age, 
and education level. 
3. The lapse of time, change of place, or change in identity of the 
questioners between the statement sought to be admitted and any 
prior questioning of the accused.197 
Again, these considerations direct a commission considering 
voluntariness to be especially cognizant of the difficulty and reality of 
military and intelligence operations in a time of war. Considering the 
characteristics of the accused allows the commission to give special 
scrutiny to statements like those of Omar Khadr, who was a minor when 
he was captured by the United States.198 Finally, the direction concerning 
 
193 Id. at 55. 
194 Id. at 56 (citing Al Rabiah v. U.S., 658 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2009)). 
195 WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 58 (citing Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 58 
(D.D.C. 2009)). 
196 Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2190, 
2580 (2009). 
197 Id. 
198 See Peter Finn, Former Boy Soldier, Youngest Guantanamo Detainee, Heads 
Toward Military Tribunal, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/09/AR2010020904020.html. 
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the lapse of time, change in place, and change in identity of the 
questioners between interrogations relates to the idea of tainted 
interrogation statements. For example, if an abusive interrogation that 
elicited a statement was followed shortly by a lawful interrogation 
informed by the statement gleaned through abuse, the commission 
should consider that string of events in determining the voluntariness of 
a statement given in the second interrogation. Likewise, detainee 
arguments that a particular statement was involuntary should be 
considered in the context of prior events. Even if an abusive 
interrogation occurred, if a subsequent statement occurred after a long 
lapse in time, in a different place, with different questioners, and 
uninformed by statements made in the previous, abusive interrogation, 
that statement should likely be admitted. 
TDERRA adopts the voluntariness standard of the MCA09199 
because it 1) represents a reasoned attempt to deal with the difficulties 
of voluntariness inquiries in the context of active military operations 
and 2) was vetted and cleared by both Congress and the President after 
extensive discussions, making passage and signing much easier than the 
creation of a new standard. Inevitably, a new standard would cause 
political questions about how it would treat particular statements 
differently than the MCA09 test. More importantly, though, there is no 
substantive reason to deviate from the MCA09 standard at this point. 
The standard passed in the MCA09 represents Congress’ and the 
President’s reasoning on the subject as of 2009, and no problems have 
emerged in the military commissions as of the writing of this article that 
would recommend altering that test. 
K. Particular Statements Against Interest 
 In addition to the general test for determining the voluntariness of 
particular statements, TDERRA provides a presumption in favor of the 
voluntariness and reliability of statements against interest given before 
CSRTs, Administrative Review Boards (hereinafter “ARBs”), and in 
compliance with the Army Field Manual (hereinafter “AFM”).200 These 
bright lines will help habeas judges sort through the tangle of statements 
to determine which should be admissible and which should not.  
 CSRTs were designed as a “formal review of all the information 
 
199 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(4)(B)-(C) (2010). 
200 Id. § 2(e)(4)(D). 
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related to a detainee to determine whether each person meets the criteria 
to be designated as an enemy combatant.”201 Military officers presided at 
the CSRTs, and the detainee had a personal representative to view 
classified information and assist him in presenting “reasonably 
available” information to the tribunal, but not act as an advocate.202 The 
government was required to present all of its evidence relevant to the 
detainee’s combatant status, including evidence that tended to negate 
the detainee’s status as a combatant, and the tribunal made its 
determination by a preponderance of the evidence.203 The tribunals were 
modeled on Army regulation 190-8, which concerns military tribunals 
used to make determinations in compliance with Article 5 of the Third 
Geneva Convention, because Hamdi suggested that “a process based on 
existing military regulations . . . might be sufficient to meet due process 
standards.”204 
 After the one-time CSRT process, ARBs conducted an annual 
review of detainees to determine whether each detainee “should be 
released, transferred or further detained.”205 Like CSRTs, detainees were 
allowed to appear before the military officers who made up the board 
and present evidence with the assistance of a personal 
representative.206 The determinations of ARBs were “based primarily on 
threat assessment and intelligence value of each detainee.”207 
 The relatively formal CSRT and ARB processes provided 
detainees an opportunity to state their case before a decision-making 
body with no fear of coercion. Given the incentive for detainees to be 
forthcoming and honest with the CSRTs and ARBs, and the boards’ 
goal to either determine combatant status or make a dispensation 
 
201 Guantanamo Detainee Processes, DEP’T OF DEF. (Oct. 7, 2007), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2005/d20050908process.pdf. 
202 JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R22173, DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO 
BAY 2-3 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22173.pdf.  
203 Id.  
204 Gordon England, Sec’y of the Navy, U.S. Dep’t of Def. News Briefing: Special 
Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunals (March 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.usembassy.it/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2005_03/alia/a5033003.htm. 
205 Press Release, Dep’t of Def., Guantanamo Bay Detainee Administrative Review 
Board Decisions Completed (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases 
/release.aspx?releaseid=9302. The Obama administration’s March 2011 executive order 
creates a similar review process for Guantanamo detainees, but with file reviews occurring 
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decision, detainee statements against interest before these bodies should 
be entitled to a presumption of voluntariness and reliability. 
  With regard to statements made in compliance with the AFM, 
one habeas judge has declared unreliable all evidence resulting from 
interrogations not in compliance with the AFM.208 This goes too far, as 
statements that are not taken in compliance with the AFM should be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The ruling speaks, however, to the 
important difference between AFM and non-AFM statements. For better 
or worse, the AFM is now the gold standard for American 
interrogation,209 and statements taken in compliance with it should be 
considered free of the possible taint of coercion. Thus, statements 
against interest given in compliance with the AFM should be entitled to 
a presumption in favor of their voluntariness and reliability.  
L. Habeas for Detainees Tried or Convicted by Military 
Commission or Subject to Executive Transfer Efforts 
 TDERRA includes a stay of habeas applications for detainees for 
whom charges have been sworn or those who have been convicted 
under the MCA09.210 The goal is to allow military commission 
proceedings to continue without parallel litigation in habeas 
proceedings. On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued the 
executive order directing the Attorney General to conduct a “review of 
the status of each individual currently detained at Guantanamo 
[Bay].”211 New charges in military commissions were suspended 
pending the review.212 As of the date of this article, the suspension has 
 
208 See WITTES ET AL., supra note 51, at 56 (citing Al Rabiah v. U.S., 658 F. Supp. 2d 
11 (D.D.C. 2009)). 
209 See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009). Executive Order No. 
13,491 sets forth the importance of the Army Field Manual:   
[A]n individual in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, 
employee, or other agent of the United States Government, or detained within a 
facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United 
States, in any armed conflict, shall not be subjected to any interrogation 
technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not 
authorized by and listed in Army Field Manual 2-22.3[]. 
Id.  
210 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(f) (2010). 
211 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (creating a task force to 
review “the status of each individual currently detained at Guantanamo. . . .”).  
212 See Obaydullah v. Obama, 609 F.3d 444 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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been lifted,213 but no new charges have yet been sworn and referred.214 
 In Obaydullah v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit Court considered the 
appeal of a detainee who was charged before a military commission 
with “conspiracy to provide and providing material support for 
terrorism.”215 While charged in 2008, no military commission 
proceeding had begun as of February 2010, when the D.C. Circuit Court 
decided whether to continue a stay issued by the district court pending 
military commissions proceedings.216 The court held that when charges 
have not yet been referred and the government can provide no evidence 
to the court that military commission proceedings are imminent, such 
that the possibility of such proceedings is speculative, a stay is not 
appropriate.217 The court made clear that a stay may be appropriate “in 
anticipation of an imminent military commission proceeding,” but it 
found that such a situation did not exist in the case at issue.218 
 TDERRA does not seek to institute a stay of habeas petitions 
pending military commissions proceedings as a tool to indefinitely 
avoid habeas review. Rather, the stay is intended to allow the 
government to begin military commission proceedings without the fear 
of interference or parallel habeas litigation. Detainees should not be 
forced to wait for years while charges are sworn but not acted upon. On 
the other hand, the Obama administration should be encouraged to use 
the military commissions system it helped create in the MCA09 because 
detention pursuant to a war crimes conviction is more certain in terms 
of its ending point and proven to a higher standard of proof than law of 
war detention. The burden of carrying on habeas litigation 
simultaneously with military commission proceedings would be a 
disincentive for the use of military commissions because an entire trial 
 
213 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: New 
Actions on Guantanamo and Detainee Policy (Mar. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-guant-
namo-and-detainee-policy (“The Secretary of Defense will issue an order rescinding his 
prior suspension on the swearing and referring of new charges in the military 
commissions.”). 
214 During the suspension on new military commission charges, some guilty pleas were 
reached on existing charges. E.g. Ben Fox, Terrorism Suspect Reaches Plea Deal in 
Guantanamo Trial, BOS. GLOBE, July 8, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/ 
nation/articles/2010/07/08/us_reaches_plea_deal_at_guantanamo_military_trial/. 
215 Obaydullah, 609 F.3d at 446. 
216 Id.  
217 Id. at 448. 
218 Id. at 449. 
KUHN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:31 PM 
2011 TERRORIST DETENTION REVIEW REFORM ACT 263 
could be undermined by an adverse habeas ruling at any moment. If, 
however, the administration is certain that habeas petitions will be 
stayed pending military commission trial and sentence, it would be 
more likely to try appropriate cases by military commission.  
M. Limits on Second or Successive Habeas Applications 
 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(hereinafter “AEDPA”) limits second or successive habeas petitions by 
state and federal prisoners.219 TDERRA uses220 those AEDPA restrictions 
as a model for limits on second or successive habeas petitions by 
covered individuals.221 The goal, to the extent possible, is to make 
detainees’ habeas review a one-shot process, to be followed by a 
periodic administrative review process for those individuals whose 
detainability is affirmed by the habeas court and who are subject to 
long-term detention.  
 TDERRA requires second and successive habeas claims that 
were presented in previous petitions to be dismissed.222 It also requires 
the district court to dismiss habeas claims that were not presented in 
previous petitions unless there is a prima facie showing that 1) “the 
factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered 
previously through the exercise of due diligence” and 2) “the facts 
underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a 
whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found that the 
covered individual was lawfully detained.”223 The government could 
“take an interlocutory appeal from a decision by the district court to 
grant consideration of a second or successive habeas petition.”224 
 These restrictions are modeled off of the AEDPA reforms and 
would limit the responsibility of the D.C. District Court to adjudicate 
habeas claims that had either already been heard or could have 
previously brought with proper due diligence.225 The reforms will create 
 
219 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2010). 
220 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(g) (2010). 
221 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 
106, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
222 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(g)(1) (2010). 
223 Id. § 2(g)(2). 
224 Id. § 2(g)(3)(B). 
225 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 106. 
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incentives for detainees and their counsel to ensure that all of their 
relevant claims are adjudicated in the first instance, and will help clear 
the backlog of cases from the D.C. District Court.226 The Guantanamo 
Bay habeas cases have crowded out other litigation on the D.C. District 
Court’s docket, as seen by Chief Judge Lamberth’s statement in March 
2009 that the court would not try any civil cases during the spring or 
summer of 2009.227 While detainee habeas petitions should be 
adjudicated fairly and promptly, other pending litigation deserves the 
same treatment. AEDPA-style reforms will ensure efficiency in the 
adjudication of habeas claims, allow administrative proceedings to 
control after initial Article III review of detainability, and streamline the 
D.C. District Court’s docket. 
N. Prohibition on Release into the United States 
 Finally, TDERRA clearly prohibits the release of detainees into 
the United States.228 Instead of outright release, the bill provides for a 
detainee released by a habeas court to be transferred into the custody of 
the Department of Homeland Security (hereinafter “DHS”) “for the 
purpose of transferring the individual to the country of citizenship of the 
individual or to another country.”229 The legislation requires DHS to 
house individuals whose habeas petitions are granted separately from 
those detained as “unprivileged enemy belligerents,” and to effectuate a 
transfer “as expeditiously as possible,” consistent with national security 
and the ban on transferring individuals to countries where they will 
likely be tortured.230 In addition to alleviating fears that terrorists will be 
released into America’s neighborhoods,231 such an outright ban would 
also provide clarity for the habeas judges, who are nervous about the 
 
226 Id. 
227 Jordan Weissman, Chief Judge: D.C. District Court Will Postpone Civil Trials to 
Handle Gitmo Cases, THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 17, 2009, 11:50 AM), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/03/chief-judge-dc-district-court-will-postpone-civil-
trials-to-handle-gitmo-cases.html. 
228 S. 3707, § 2(h)(1)(A) (“No court shall order the release of a covered individual into 
the United States, its territories, or possessions.”). 
229 Id. § 2(h)(2)(A). 
230 Id. § 2(h)(2)(B). 
231 See House Democrats Leave Gitmo Closing Money out of Bill, USA TODAY, May 4, 
2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-05-04-gitmo-congress_N.htm 
(quoting Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell as saying, “[t]he American people want 
to keep the terrorists at Guantanamo out of their neighborhoods and off of the battlefield.”). 
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possibility of releasing dangerous individuals.232  
 Some may argue that an outright ban on release into the United 
States is a solution in search of a problem, as no detainees have been 
released into the United States at this point. As of February 16, 2011, 
detainees have been quite successful in their habeas petitions and in 
gaining release. Up to that point, detainees prevailed in thirty-eight of 
fifty-one habeas proceedings.233 Still, though, no detainees have been 
released into the United States, and the release orders issued in cases 
won by detainees have not called for physical release.234 Instead, they 
have generally required the government to engage in “all necessary and 
appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate” release.235 
 That said, the possibility of a constitutional conflict between the 
judiciary and the executive relating to a detainee release into the United 
States remains. The Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Kiyemba v. 
Obama, which concerned the release of Chinese Uighur detainees.236 In 
that case, the D.C. Circuit Court held that the judiciary does not have 
power to order the release of a Guantanamo detainee into the United 
States.237 The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case back to the 
D.C. Circuit Court after all the detainees in question received at least 
one offer of resettlement, some of which were accepted, others which 
were not.238 In the process, the Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit 
decision holding that the judiciary lacks the power to grant detainees 
release into the United States.239 Thus, the legal issue of whether such 
power exists is still very much alive.240 One could imagine, for example, 
a case in which a habeas court orders the release an individual whom 
the Executive views as dangerous. If the Supreme Court denies the 
authority of the courts to order release, the detainee in question would 
have the right to habeas corpus, but no effective remedy. On the other 
hand, if the Supreme Court accepts the authority of courts to order 
 
232 See Lee, supra note 9. 
233 Larkin Reynolds, GTMO Habeas Numbers Update, LAWFARE (Feb. 16, 2011, 2:52 
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/02/gtmo-habeas-numbers-update/. 
234 See Huq, supra note 14, at 419. 
235 Id. 
236 Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 458 (2009). 
237 Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1028-29 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
238 Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam).  
239 Id. 
240 A related issue is what immigration status, if any, released detainees would possess 
upon entry into the United States. 
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release, the executive could be forced to release an individual that the 
administration sees as dangerous to Americans. Taken even further, 
even if the judiciary has the authority to order release, the Executive 
could simply refuse to effectuate the order, leading to a balance of 
powers crisis.  
 To avoid the scenarios outlined above, TDERRA attempts to 
provide a measured, reasonable approach to dealing with detainees 
ordered released by the courts. That is, upon an order of release, the 
detainee in question is separated from those held as unprivileged enemy 
belligerents and held by DHS pending release.241 The administration 
must attempt to transfer or release the detainee to another country as 
soon as possible, while protecting national security. Habeas judges 
would no longer fear the potential negative national security impact of 
their decision in favor of a detainee, and the executive would have time 
to wind down detention in a reasonable manner. 
 Another potential criticism of a broad statement against release 
into the United States is that it does not make an exception for 
American citizen detainees who are held on United States soil. The 
argument is that for citizens held in the country, at least, it is beyond the 
authority of Congress to forbid courts from ordering those detainees 
released. First, in response, while the reaffirmation of the authority to 
detain in TDERRA allows the President to detain citizens in the United 
States under the law of war, such as Padilla, whether to use that 
authority would be up to the President. Given the courts’ skepticism of 
the detention of both Padilla, a citizen, and al-Marri, a permanent legal 
resident captured in the United States, future Presidents may not see the 
need to use that authority. Second, beyond holding citizens in the 
United States, it is speculative that this or future administrations will 
hold any unprivileged enemy belligerents in the United States. Third, 
even if citizens are held in the United States under the law of war, it is 
possible that the courts would view this instruction as they likely would 
in application to non-citizens held at Guantanamo — as a reasonable 
(and compliant with constitutional due process guarantees) way to 
effectuate a release order of the judiciary without abrogating the 
responsibility of the executive to protect national security. 
III. SOME REMAINING ISSUES FOR CONGRESS AFTER 
 
241 S. 3707, 111th Cong. § 2(h) (2010).  
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TDERRA 
 TDERRA deals exclusively with the problems posed by the 
habeas proceedings for current and future law of war detainees. By 
reforming the procedures by which such habeas petitions are 
adjudicated, the proceedings will take on added legitimacy with the 
input of Congress and the President. Judges will be relieved of the duty 
to create procedural rules and will be able to focus on applying the new 
legislation to the cases before them, and the dicey political and legal 
problems posed by the possibility of a detainee being ordered released 
into the United States are defused. While accomplishing those goals 
would be no small feat, the legislation does not touch the even more 
contentious issues of congressional backing for administrative long-
term detention procedures and the closing of Guantanamo Bay. These 
issues will likely remain for the foreseeable future, as there is little 
evidence that there is the political will on the part of Congress and the 
President to confront them. If Congress and the President decline to 
answer the call of the habeas judges and fail to pass TDERRA or similar 
legislation (which many may see as necessary, even if they disagree on 
the details), one imagines that legislation on long-term detention and 
closure of Guantanamo Bay will not be signed in the foreseeable future. 
This is not to say that these are the only two issues that will remain to 
be addressed after passage of the TDERRA or similar legislation, but 
they are certainly two prominent examples. 
 Long-term detention of unprivileged enemy belligerents by the 
United States is ongoing.242 The ARB process of annual review was a 
process for annual reevaluation of detainees to determine whether 
detention was still necessary.243 ARBs are no longer occurring,244 but in 
March 2011, the Obama administration issued an executive order to 
establish a similar review process.245 The administration is decreasing 
 
242 See generally Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney 
Gen.) [hereinafter Oversight] (discussing detainees who will be neither tried nor released).  
243 News Release, Dep’t of Def., Administrative Review Implementation Directive 
Issued (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx? 
releaseid=7737. 
244 A Department of Defense publication indicates that the last ARB occurred in 
February 2009. DEP’T OF DEF., ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD SUMMARY (2009), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/news/arb4.pdf; See also Charlie Savage, Detainee 
Review Proposal is Prepared for Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22/us/22gitmo.html.  
245 Press Release, The White House, supra note 7. 
KUHN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2011  7:31 PM 
268 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL Vol. 35:2 
the population at Guantanamo Bay largely through transfers to other 
countries, but officials believe that there are forty-eight detainees who 
will likely not be released because they pose too great of a national 
security risk.246 Whether or not that prediction ends up being true, those 
detainees should be reviewed at least annually to determine whether 
there is still a need to detain them. Such a review should be 
administrative, with the decision-making board made of the various 
relevant agencies (DHS, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, 
Director of National Intelligence, etc.), and the detainee should be 
provided a personal representative. The key inquiries for such a review 
board should be whether the detainee has intelligence value and 
continues to pose a threat to the national security of the United States,247 
and the detainee should be allowed to provide evidence of steps taken 
post-capture to reform and separate himself from enemy groups. With 
such a review in place, the American people and the world could rest 
assured that these detainees will not serve a de facto life sentence 
without an opportunity for release.248 
 Political resistance to a congressionally-required review of this 
sort would likely come from those who claim to have detainees’ best 
interests at heart. For some on the political left, the negative of 
statutorily enshrining a system of long-term detention would outweigh 
the benefit of the review that would run to the detainees.249 In fact, 
though, long-term detention of law of war detainees is currently 
 
246 Oversight, supra note 242 (statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen.).  
247 This standard would be in contrast to the standard before the habeas courts, which is 
whether a detainee is covered by the detention authority of the President. It would be a shift 
in focus, from whether a particular detainee could be detained, to whether he should be 
detained. 
248 The review system established by the Obama administration satisfies several desired 
criteria. However, one notable deviation from the ARB process is the standard for 
determining whether continued detention is warranted, which is whether it is “necessary to 
protect against a significant threat to the security of the United States.” Press Release, The 
White House, supra note 7. That standard omits threats to United States allies and 
consideration of a detainee’s intelligence value. Id. It also includes considerable vagueness 
in the undefined terms “necessary” and “significant.” Id. It remains to be seen how that 
standard will be instituted in practice. See id.  
249 E.g. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, President Obama Issues Executive 
Order Institutionalizing Indefinite Detention (Mar. 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/president-obama-issues-executive-order-
institutionalizing-indefinite-detention (“While appearing to be a step in the right direction, 
providing more process to Guantánamo detainees is just window dressing for the reality that 
today’s executive order institutionalizes indefinite detention, which is unlawful, unwise and 
un-American.”). 
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ongoing and has been for some time. Given that, it seems that statutorily 
requiring an annual administrative review would be to the clear benefit 
of the detainees and the transparency of the detention system. 
 As for closing Guantanamo Bay, despite the President’s 
executive order at the beginning of his Presidency,250 there remains a 
deep divide in Congress over the wisdom of moving detainees to the 
United States, and there is no foreseeable approval for appropriations 
for such a purpose.251 One reason for this is that the legal rights of 
detainees who are moved from Guantanamo Bay to the United States 
remain unclear. Without some degree of certainty that detainees will not 
gain additional rights upon their entry into the United States, the 
outlook for closing Guantanamo Bay will remain bleak. Of particular 
concern is the potential ability of transferred detainees to be released 
into the United States if successful in their habeas petitions. Even 
though the Kiyemba decision in the D.C. Circuit Court was vacated,252 it 
provides a basis for believing that detainees at Guantanamo Bay will not 
actually be released into the United States, at least absent a decision by 
the Supreme Court.  
While Congress debates the closing of Guantanamo Bay, the fact 
remains that new detainee transfers to the prison have largely halted 
since 2004.253 Because our military and intelligence services have no 
 
250 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
251 In considering the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, both the Senate and 
House Armed Services Committees rejected the administration’s request for funds to 
renovate the prison at Thomson, Illinois, as an ultimate transfer site for Guantanamo 
detainees. See Charlie Savage, Closing Guantanamo Fades as a Priority, N.Y. TIMES, June 
25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/26/us/politics/26gitmo.html. The 2011 National 
Defense Authorization Act prohibited the use of fiscal year 2011 Department of Defense 
funds to transfer Guantanamo detainees to the United States, despite protest from President 
Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, 124 Stat. 4137 (2010); Press Release, The White 
House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President on H.R. 6523 (Jan. 7, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/07/statement-president-hr-6523 
(“Section 1032 [barring the use of funds to transfer detainees into the United States] 
represents a dangerous and unprecedented challenge to critical executive branch authority to 
determine when and where to prosecute Guantanamo detainees.”); see Peter Landers, 
Congress Bars Gitmo Transfers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052748704774604576036520690885858.html. 
252 Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam). 
253 See Huq, supra note 14, at 405 (“Anecdotal information suggests that inflows to the 
base in fact largely dried up in 2004, after the Supreme Court’s first interventions in the 
field.”). 
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prison in which to hold high-value detainees,254 one wonders whether 
our forces are capturing (and interrogating) all of the enemies that they 
could be, and likewise, whether our forces are killing more enemies 
than they should be.255 It is unacceptable to risk losing valuable 
intelligence and to create ethical dilemmas for our military because 
policymakers lack the political will to provide a prison to hold law of 
war detainees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite an early flurry of activity and a deadline imposed to close 
the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, the Obama administration has 
shown little appetite for confronting the difficult issues relating to 
detention in the War on Terror. Other than a relatively minor revamping 
of the military commissions system, President Obama’s pre-election 
criticism of Bush administration policies and post-election discussion of 
charting a new course in detention policy has dissolved into paralysis 
and procrastination. Political demagoguery and legitimate policy 
differences among senators and congressmen create an environment 
inhospitable to the development of consensus detention legislation, but 
those obstacles could be overcome with leadership from the President. 
Without that leadership, though, detention policy has merely become a 
tool used by those on both the political left and right for their own 
electoral reasons. 
With the political branches unwilling or unable to confront 
detention policy in a serious and substantive way, day-to-day 
policymaking has largely fallen to the federal judiciary. This abdication 
serves those politicians interested in detention policy only as a political 
issue, as they can periodically score points off of the latest 
developments while avoiding the responsibility of legislating. In fact, 
the very reasons that make the avoidance of detention policy attractive 
— responsibility for a complex policy implicating national security and 
civil liberties — demand the input of all branches of government. When 
 
254 Charley Keyes, Gates: Prospects for closing Guantanamo ‘very, very low’, CNN, 
Feb. 17, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-17/politics/senate.gates.gitmo_1_terrorists-
detention-center-military-commissions?_s=PM:POLITICS (“Asked about what the United 
States would do about holding so-called high-value targets… [Secretary of Defense] Gates 
responded, ‘I think the honest answer to that is, we don’t know.’”). 
255 See Cole, supra note 8, at 695-96 (“[A]rguments [that there is no place for detention 
of combatants in an armed conflict with foes such as al Qaeda or the Taliban] may be the 
perverse effect of encouraging states to use lethal force.”). 
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a detainee is released or determined to be lawfully held, the American 
people should be confident that the decision was a result of a policy 
developed through thoughtful interaction between the branches of 
government. Currently, that is not the case. 
If enacted, TDERRA or similar legislation would provide much-
needed congressional and presidential input into detainee habeas 
proceedings. Undoubtedly, the issues are complex, the stakes are high, 
and the politics are potent, but Congress and the President should 
coalesce to bless some form of procedural rules for these proceedings. 
In their absence, habeas petitions continue to be adjudicated with the 
judges suffering from a lack of procedural clarity, the litigants unable to 
expect decisional consistency, and the American people impacted by 
detention policy written by a single, unelected branch of government. 
 
